Red Headed Stepchild
(The Barrett family memoir of Navy Life)
by Sophie Ruth Meranski with photos


WEB PAGE 66 Contains NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CHAPTER 1923-4 + Jack Barrett "TACTICS" Thesis 1924, + Jack Barrett Overseas Transportation Office after Pearl Harbor attack Chaplain Maguire #1174 p 66 H-A-W-A-I-I


Ch NINE IX BREAD ON THE WATERS from THE CAPTAIN WEARS A CROSS 1943 by Captain WILLIAM MAGUIRE Pacific Fleet Chaplain: Among the more trying tasks that faced me in my office was handling the requests of Navy wives to help them and their children to obtain berths on board the few ships that were avilable to evacuate families of service personnel to the mainland. It became necessary, in compliance with a despatch from Washington, to make up lists of those who lived in the Hawaiian Naval District and to embark them without show of partiality.At the top of each list were placed the names of the sick, but alas, it was impossible to please everyone.The telephone rang continuously and between calls, women came with their children to the office and stressed their reasons for claiming the right to be the first to leave. At one time in December, there were over three thousand standing by to take passage for home. It did no good to explain that I had little or no connection with the business of evacuation, for they were quick to remind me that my recommendations would no go unheeded.They referred to a statement of policy which they had read in the papers to the effect that medical officers and chaplains would be consulted regarding the merits of doubtful cases. I found it quite easy, however, to be patient with the individual problems of our Navy wives.For a quarter of a century in peace time I had found countless reasons for sympathizing with Navy families on account of their nomadic way of living. The greater part of a Navy man's life is spent at sea, and this may account, strange as it may seem for the fine family spirit he has of affection and loyalty. The Navy wife, unlike the Army wife who lives on a government reservation,always faces,when she arrives at the port at which her husband's ship is based, the strenuous business of house hunting. Among my most vivid memories are the strange shacks and boarding houses Navy people called home years ago on the Asistic Station. But they were cheerful about it, and they still laugh when telling of their experiences.They will tell you about the many times they went "broke".Even though the Navy furnishes funds for transportation and the shipment of household effects,change of duty usually means spending the family's savings.Moving from the tropics to northern zones requires buying a new outfit of clothing for the family. Furniture, on arrival, is usually in need of repair; and the rents seem to grow unusually high when the Navy comes to town. Departures of ships from Honolulu were made in military secrecy. Announcements of sailings came by telephone to the homes with only a few hours alloted for getting trunks and hand-bags to the dock.This uncertainty and the necessity of staying at all times near the family 'phone put ordinary shopping tours in the class of strategic planning. If someone failed to get the word about a sailing, there was always a willing substitute waiting with bag and baggage at the ship's gangway.Navy families for months literally lived "out of a suitcase." As was to be expected, in accordance with ancient tradition, word got around that the chaplain could "fix it." Honolulu.When they found their names listed among those to go, not knowing that it would be unwise to load a ship entirely with sick people, they protested and suddenly thought,"maybe the chaplain can fix that too."Those without children who had jobs in the Navy Yard and in the city shops could not understand why they had to leave. Others, whose husbands were on duty on repair ships anchored in Pearl Harbor, felt they were being badly handled.The families of those who served in our cruisers and other ships who came in periodically for brief overhaul periods,wanted to remain because it would afford an occasional family reunion which they could not have had on the mainland.It was a dificult situation, and it was my job to be a sort of buffer between the wives and the Navy Yard officers whose unpleasant responsibility it was to make the final decisions. The work of assisting the evacuees required one or more trips to the Navy Yard to pleaad my cases.An office had been established in the administration building, which was called the "OVERSEAS TRANSPORT[ATION] SERVICE." The one in charge was an experienced officer of the regular Navy, Commander John B. Barrett. We had served together in 1930 in the Asiatic Fleet.I marvelled at the patience of this harried officer,and I have since wondered how he kept going. On entering his office, there was usually a crowd of women and children waiting for a chance to get the ear of one of Barrett's assistants or even the ear of Barrett himself.His job was anything but a sinecure. I actually felt sorry for him every time I came and presented, with a tear in my voice, the demands of some unhappy Navy wife who complained that the blackout was ruinous to her little boy's peace of mind, or the woman of wealth who had a palace in Pasadena which needed her personal supervision.Commander Barrett was so kind and sympathetic in squeezing so many of my clients on board that I became eloquently profuse in my thanks. He was particularly kind in helping me find a place on board a transport for Captain Barry Wilson's colored maid Claribel.One day with a smile on his freckled face, he exclained, "How can I refuse you? Don't you remember the night in Chefoo when my wife arrived alone from Tientsin? They told her there wasn't a room in town, not even a park bench. A ricksha coolie got hold of you, and you scouted around until you found a room in Wineglass's boarding house. I wish I could forget, but I can't. All I can say is, 'Take it easy, chum; you're running me ragged.'" The Chefoo incident had vanished from my memory. Unknowingly, ten years before, I had cast Chinese bread upon the waters. John Barrett was equal to the challenge of that heart-breaking emergency. I can still see him checking the long list of evacuees and shaking his weary head to the accompaniemnt of a woeful, pidgin English, "No can do." But he salvaged his sense of humor, always finding time for a friendly chat. I seldom left his noisy office without a new story. One afternoon with Father [Walter} Mahler in tow, I drove out to his home on the Ala Wai to pay my respects. I had not see Mrs. Barrett since that night of house hunting in Chefoo [1931].John was about five years old. He showed us his menagerie of stuffed animals.It was the best variety of wild beasts I had ever seen.It struck me that Commander Barrett's old shipmates had the boy's collection in mind whenever they went ashore in strange and foreign ports of the world.John had a little pigeon that came every morning for crumbs and sat outside the window while they both enjoyed the radio program.He flew away when John [left] for school but always returned when the child got back, for thyen it was time to play together on the front lawn.[The poigeon disappeared for a week or so...] then One morning he discovered his bird-buddy again standing outside the window-screen, chipper and as good as new. When orders came for Father Mahler and me to proceed to San Diego for a tour of shore duty, Commander Barrett again showed that he meant what he said about the little favor I had done him in China. He visited at least three ships before deciding that he had found the one that would suit us. He had little to choose from, and he was not a bit pleased with the results. He took us one day in June [1942] to a transport, a ship that for years had made the round-trip from New York to Havana, heaviuly laden with freight cars. It was really an old ferry-boat, but it was the best thing afloat at the disposal of Commander John B. Barrett, U.S.N." NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CHAPTER On 16 May 1923 Jack received orders on the WYOMING: "When directed by the Commanding Officer, you will regard yourself detached from duty on board the USS WYOMING and will proceed to Newport, Rhode Island, and on 2 July 1923 will report to the President, United States Naval War College for duty under instruction." He took the Junior Course and commuted by ferry from Jamestown on the west side of Narragansett Bay prior to the building of the present bridge. At the Newport Naval War College J.R.P. Pringle was the Chief of Staff July 1923 to 1924, and E. S. Jackson was President of the War College. Jack took one month's leave, then attended the War College to June 1924, when he was ordered to the MARBLEHEAD.He was awarded a diploma when he completed the Junior Course and wrote his thesis on TACTICS. We have an undated paper from the Naval War College, which reads: "In connection with this request, you might be interested to know that the President of the War College on your last fitness report recommended you for duty under Naval Intelligence, Naval Attache/ or Asisstant Naval Attacvhe/ and language student." MARY JOSEPH 1923 LETTER Presentation Convent 1404 Mason St May 27, 1923 She made a will about five years ago. She left one half to our cousin Mrs. Craig (Robert J. Mehegan's sister) and the other half is for the support of our cousin Mrs. Kate Kerrigan. I mean the interest of it. When she dies, you are to get the half.The house is worth very little. The lot of which it is may sell for sixteen or eighteen thousand dolarrs. Another lot is valued at two thousand dollars. One half of all goes to Aunt Johanna's grandson Robert Fahrbach. He has just been married. The other half is to be divided between Mrs. Craig and Kate Kerrigan. More than two thousand will be taken from my sister's part of the estate for debts and late expenses of funeral and dctor. I expect to go to Los Angeles soon after the nineteenth. 4100 East Third Street. -=Your father has written me that your brother has accepted a position in new York. he is a very fine young man. =Sister Mary Joseph [Sophie: "NB




In May 1923 Jack's aunt Kate Barrett died in San Francisco. She was born 1855 or 1856 on Goddard Street, South Boston and lost her parents to lung disease in December 1859 and February 1863 and went to live with her aunt Ellen Mehegan until after the transcontinental railway opened in 1869, when she went to live with her aunt Johanna Hession in San Francisco. Her older sister Mary wrote explaining her disposition of the property she inheited from Johanna Hession: MARY JOSEPH 1923 LETTER Presentation Convent 1404 Mason Street, San Francisco May 27, 1923 "She made a will about five years ago. She left one half to our cousin Mrs. Craig (Robert J. Mehegan's sister) and the other half is for the support of our cousin Mrs. Kate Kerrigan. I mean the interest of it. When she dies, you are to get the half.The house is worth very little. The lot of which it is may sell for sixteen or eighteen thousand dolarrs. Another lot is valued at two thousand dollars. One half of all goes to Aunt Johanna's grandson Robert Fahrbach. He has just been married. The other half is to be divided between Mrs. Craig and Kate Kerrigan. More than two thousand will be taken from my sister's part of the estate for debts and late expenses of funeral and dctor. I expect to go to Los Angeles soon after the nineteenth. 4100 East Third Street. -=Your father has written me that your brother has accepted a position in new York. he is a very fine young man. =Sister Mary Joseph" [Sophie: "NB Jack Barrett Naval War College TACTICS thesis 1924 Newport Rhode Island--BEGINNING TACTICS THESIS 1924 JACK BARRETT I.TACTICAL PRINCIPLES INTRODUCTORY:- Webster's NEW INERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1919) defines Tactics thus: The art of handling troops or ships in battle on in the immediate presence of the enemy' the methods by which a commander seeks to defeat the enemy after battle is joined." --Darrieus' War on the Sea (U.S.Naval Institute 1908) (p 10 and following) states: ---"General Bonnal called attention to the definitions, unlike in words rather than in sense, adopted by military writers of authority in such matters.Napoleon never used the word Strategy; sometimes he used the expression GRAND TACTICS, sometimes the term HIGHER BRANCHES OIF WAR.--Clausewitz defined strategy as the USE OF BATTLE IN WAR; tactics as THE USE OF TROOPS IN BATTLE.--For Jomini, strategy includes all that goes on in the theatre of war, while tactics is theart of fighting on a field of battle.-- According to Moltke, STRATEGY SHOWS THE BEST WAY LEADING TO THE BATTLE; IT TELLS WHERE AND WHEN ONE OUGHT TO FIGHT. TACTICS TEACHES HOW TO USE THE DIFFERENT ARMS IN FIGHTING; it tells HOW ONE OUGHT TO FIGHT."-Therefore we may define TACTICS AS THE ART OF BATTLE. =Strategy consists of plans, dispositions and movements to gain sufficient preponderance at critical points to obtain success of war plans.--Tactics, in the localized concentrated war which a battle is, consists of plans, dispositions, and actions to decide the crisis of the battle so as to obtain success of battle plans. --The relation of tactics to strategy therefore parallels the relation of BATTLE plans to WAR plans. --Since the art of battle is part of the art of war, tactics may be said to be part of strategy. Reference above to Napoleon's use of the term "grand tactics" as the equivalent of "strategy" indicated his recognition of many distinct battles. Now, although this combination may be either skilful or the reverse, and the result in a great measure depends upon that point, still the battle itself stands before it in point of importance,for nothing but a combination of successful battles gives a good result."--Darrieus "War on the Sea" says: " Mahan, in agreement with most military writers, fixed the line of separation between strategy and tactics at the point where the two hostile forces come into CONTACT. But it must be clearly understood that the expression 'contact' is not to be taken literally, implying within sight., at short distance, etc.There is really contact between the two hostile warlike forces when they know each other's positions with such exactness that their encounter, the final object of the war, is unavoidable."-- Foch "Principles of War" (1920, p. 48 says: "'The art of war consists in always having more forces than the adversary, even with an army weaker than his own, on the point where one is attacking or being attacked.' - Napoleon. As we have previously seen, modern war knows but one argument: the tactical fact, battle. In view of this it asks of strategy that it should both bring up ALL AVAILABLE FORCES TOGETHER, and engage in battle ALL THESE FORCES by means of TACTICAL IMPULSION in order to produce the shock."-- In strategy,the fundamental aim is to win the war (i.e. to impose our will upon the enemy) by successful execution of war plans to gain a decisive victory at the critical point at the critical time of the war.-- This strategic critical place and time may coincide exactly with the tactical crisis of a battle, may be considerably removed from any single tactical episode, or may even result from lapse of time and neglect to properly utilize and follow up a battle victory. (D.W.Knox Naval Institute Vol 39 No. 147 Sept. 1913 says: "Strategy is the art of using battles in war.- - - A tactical victory may prove a strategic defeat and actually harm, the end in view of the war.") p.3 ==The disastrous result of the famous victories of Pyrrhus is well known." -- Just as STRATEGY seeks a decisive advantage at the critical point and time of the war, so TACTICS seeks a decisive advantage at the critical point and time of the BATTLE.--Therefore the basic tactical objective is TO GAIN SUPERIORITY AT THE CRITICAL POINT AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT OF THE BATTLE. --Although the art of tactics consists essentially of practical execution of battle plans, it is nevertheless possible to derive knowledge of the theory underlying the practical art by study of past performances.--Foch-"Principles of War" states:- -- (Dragomiron) " First of all, science and theory are two different things, for every art may and must be in possession of its own theory, but it would be preposterous to claim for it the name of a science----. But it does not in the least follow that there should not be a theory of war.---"The theory of war does not lay claim to forming Napoleons, but it supplies a knowledge of the properties of troops and ground. It draws attention to the models, to the masterpieces achieved in the domain of war, and it smoothes thereby the path for those whom nature has endowed with military ability."--(Marshall Bugeaud) "There are few absolute principles", he said,"but still there are some. When you try to lay down a principle concerning war, at once a great number of officers, thinking they are solving the problem, exclain ' Everything depends upon circumstances, you must sail according to the wind.' But if you don't know beforehand what arrangement of sail agrees with what wind and what course, how can you sail 'according to the wind?'" --"We may conclude with reason: The art of war, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise iut would not be an art."---4- "This teaching of principles does not, however, aim at a platonic result such as mere learning or as merely filling your mind with a number of new and certain truths. 'War is before all a single art, an art wholly of execution.' (Napoleon).--To know the principles, if one did not know how to apply them, would lead to nothing. In war, a fact has priority over an idea, action over talk, execution over theory. --Useless would be any teaching that should stop at the idea, talk or theory; which did not extend to the application of principles." -) '"'Knowledge is far from achievement; but the leap does not start from ignorance; quite on the contrary, from knowledge.'"--"Anybody on the contrary who is conscious of his own ignorance or of his neeed to ask for other people's advice is always undecided, perplexed, apt to lose his point.--"General de Peucker adds on the same subject: 'Officers following a course of instruction must be amply trained TO ACT BY THEMSELVES, in order to develop their ability to utilize their theoretical knowledge in the practice of life.--To grasp a scientific truth does not mean that one is able to find it agin later on by means of reasoning. There is a long distance between an intellectual conception and that priceless faculty which allows a man to make acquired miltary knowledge the basis for his decisions in the field.'"--- "---we must have a PRTACTICAL teaching including application made to particular cases of fixed principles, drawn from history, in order [1] to prepare for EXPERIENCE, [2] to teachg the ART OF COMMANDING, [3] lastly, to impart the HABIT OF ACTING CORRECTLY WITHOUT HAVING TO REASON."--Preparation for exercise of tactical command in battle must therefore not be purely theoretical study but must primarily consist of training to ACT in accordance with fundamentally correct PRINCIPLES. -5-- Tactical Notes [Lieut. Col. Kinsman] l916, p.14-15 --"The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very obtruse; but the application OF THEM IS DIFFICULT, and cannot be made subject to rules. The CORRECT APPLICATION of PRINCIPLES to CIRCUMSTANCES is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice, until it becomes an instinct.--- Each [arm] has its special characteristic functions and is dependent on the assistance of others. The full power of an army can be EXERTED ONLY WHEN ALL ITS PARTS ACT IN CLOSE COMBINATION, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arm."--P.81 -"It is seldom possible or desirable to attempt to overwhelm an enemy everywhere."--To concentrate superior power at the decisive point, a portion of the force must be held in readiness to deliver the DECISIVE ATTACK, while the remainer is employed to DEVELOP THE ATTACK, and to wear down the enemy's power or resistance.-- -6- TACTICAL PRINCIPLES -- The fundamental tactical principle has been variously expressed. BAUDRY calls it"Relative Superiority at the critical point" - "Maximum effect at the earliest moment, in the shortest time, and over the smallest area." W.I. 2073 expresses it as follows" The fundamental tactical principle is that of superior force at the decisive point of contact."--A superior force should be brought to bear simultaneously, with full effect, and with dispatch upon a portion of the enemy force which is unable for the time being to be effectively suported by the remainder of his forcee.-==-To determine what constitutes "superiority", "critical point" and " critical time" for any given set of circumstances is the primary task in Tactics.-These terms are interrelated to the extent that "superiority" at a given point at a given time may be reversed to "inferiority" by the simple lapse of time, the critical time is not critical unless there is some "superiority" for one side or the other at that time at the "critical point", the "critical point" may shift all up and down the battle area as time passes.-=Admitting the elusiveness of the correct dfinition of the terms "superiority", "critical point", and "critical time", it may still be worth while attempting to determine some definite rules regarding them.==Superiority, however constituted, whether by gunfire, torpedo fire, gas, bombs, or other means consists primarily of SUPERIOR ABILITY TO INFLICT DAMAGE.==Usual contributory elements are: Superior numbers and superior fire effect. [accuracy,rapidity, and volume of fire.] ==The "critical time" is the period over which the crisis continues at any point.==To determine where the "critical point" will be at a given moment may well be the most difficult problem in tactics. The efforts of -7- each antagonist meet opposition tending to retard such efforts. The result is an approximation of equilibrium. Critical points then become existent where equilibrium is least stable.--The critical point" is one of these where success in attaining superiority will most speedily yield decisive result.--Where great disparity of forces exists,the superior force, by shifting of masses, may exercise considerable choice as to which point is to be THE CRITICAL POINT by simply maintaining equilibrium elsewhere and driving in at the point chosen for crisis, with all forces not required to preserve equilibrium elsewhere. The inferior force can only counter by attempting maximum possible concentration so as to reduce length of battle line, make battle line homogeneous, i.e. to extent of rendering all points equally strong and to render shifting of forces to theoretical points facile and speedy.=- Where original considerable disparity of forces does not exist, effective superiority may be gained by superior facility in concentrating a coordinated decisive attack upon a chosen point while holding at all other points.==The essential principle is the same in naval as in land battles. The quotation by Foch from Napoleon" The art of war consists in always having more force than the adversary, even with an army weaker than his own, at the point where one is attacking or being attacked." is closely similar to our expression "a superior force should be brought to bear simultaneously, with full effect, and with dispatch, upon a portion of the enemy force which is unable for the time being to be effctively supported by the remainder of his force."==Further similarity might be noted between naval concentration on one end of enemy line and military enveloping or flanking movements and between the old naval "charge through" and the military "salient angle". == We find then that the basic TACTICAL PRINCIPLE is to seek "Superiority of force at the decisive point of contact." -8- == From this basic requirement there flow the following methods of gaining superiority at the decisive point.==W.I. 2073 "A superior force should be brought to bear simultaneously, with full effect, and with dispatch, upon a portion of the enemy force which is unable, for the time being to be effectively supported by the remainder of his force."==2704 The success of any plan to bring about SUPERIORITY AT THE DECISIVE POINT OF CONTACT IS BEST PROMOTED BY-== [A] THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE==[B] THE TACTICAL CONCENTRATION OF FORCES==[C] COORDINATION OF FORCES IN ORDER THAT THE MOVEMENTS OF ALL UNITS MAY BE SO TIMED AS TO BRING ABOUT UNITED EFFORT AT THE PROPER MOMENT ==W.I. 2703. "A superior force should be brought to bear simultaneously, with full effect, and with dispatch, upon a portion of the enemy force which is unable for the time being to be effectively supported by the remainder of his force." == 2704 "The success of any plan to bring about superiority at the decisive point of contact is best promoted by - == [a] The assumption of the offensive... ==[b] The tactical concentration of forces...==[c] Coordination of forces, in order that the movements of all units may be SO TIMED as to bring about united effort at the PROPER MOMENT. == [d] Indoctrination of forces, so that there may be mutual understanding of the intentions and plans of the commander-in-chief and so that there may be coordintation... WHEN WITHOUT ORDERS. == From the preceding principles there have been evolved subordinate rules for guidance in application of these principles. As outlined in W.I. (1923) 2705, there are: == [a] The guiding principle is that of concentration of a maximum superiority on the decisive point. This decisive point will normally be the enemy battle line. == [b] Our fleet should come into action as a whole and remain tactically concentrated until the enemy's fleet has been disorganized. == [c] The cruising dispositions and approach dispositions of the fleet should provide for the maneuvers which may be rendered necessary by all probable developments in the tactical situation and at the same time permit of the necessary concentration of all the offensive units of the fleet at the correct time and place. == [d] The forces detailed to essential duties which do not permit them to support the decisive point must be kept at a minimum. == [e] All units should be in a position to execute their battle missions by the time the engagement opens.-9- If the situation favors our forces,maneuvers by them to gain a favorable position must not delay engagement with the enemy to such an extent as to lose the existing advantages.==[g] The attack will be delivered from such directions as to gain the advantages of favorable wind, sea, and light conditions, if such can be attained without sacrificing an advantageous situation or causing an undue delay in the engagement.==[h] If it is apparent that the enemy is attempting to escape or to avoid action, the advantages of wind, sea, and light conditons may have to be sacrificed, the movements of the fleet being governed by conditions favorable to cutting off the enemy's retrat and bringing him to action.==[i] The battleship divisions and the light forces should remain tactically concentrated as far as possible, not necessarily in a single rigid formation. Independent attacks by a division or a squadron of battleships on a part of the enemy's line should be avoided as liable to lead to the isolation of the unit which attempts such a movement, and so long as the fleets are engaged on approximately similar courses, the battleship divisions should remain tactically concentrated in one battle formation. Similarly the light forces should be so disposed and employed as to receive necessary support from the battle line and to support the battle line in its conduct of the battle.==[j] When our battle line is brought into action, all of the forces present which possess offensive power against the enemy battle line should simultaneouslky attack the enemy battle line. == [k] Any local advantage should be exploited to the greatest extent which is consistent with the accomplishment by the force engaged of its assigned battle mission.== Of these rules [a] re-states the basic tactical principle "maximum superiority at the decisive point", [b] states the subordinate principle of "tactical concentrtation", [d] states the subordinate principle of Economy of forces, [c], [e],. and [j] indicate the -10- subordinate principle of coordination, [i] stresses the subordinate principle of "tactical concentration", [f], [g], [h], [k], and [l] indicate prevalent doctrine, are reasonable, but are general rules rather than principles.==These rules have not the uiform effect of the basic principle but simply serve as guides to existing doctrine as to probable normal methods of application of principles.== Summing up, our basic TACTICAL PRINCIPLE IS: "To concentrate maximum effort to gain superiority at the decisive point with dispatch." and == SUBORDINATE PRINCIPLES are: == [a] To assume the offensive insofar as consistent with mission.==[b] to keep force tactically concentrated. == [c] To coordinate efforts of all forces against enemy battle line, both as to time and place.== [d] To economize forces (i.e. to avoid dissipation of force for non-important or non-related activities.) == [e] To indoctrinate forces so that there may be mutual understanding and coordination with minimum of orders and communication. == [f] To seek most favorable natural conditions insofar as other considerations permit.11- II. AIDS TO TACTICS: [a] COMMUNICATIONS: It is obvious that accurate information is necessary to an officer in tactical command as a basis for decisions.Likewise it is obvious that the decisions and resulting orders made by the officer in tactical command must be communicated to his subordinates promptly in order that their actions may be properly coordinated in accordance with his decisions and orders. In the "Naval Institute" Col.39 No 147, Sept. 1913, p. 961, Lieutenant Commander Bronson says,"No matter how capable the squadron commanders, no matter how thoroughly they are indoctrinated", how complete their understanding and loyalty to the battle plan of the commander-in-chief, how comprehensive and carefully considered the plan:- there still will exist a strong possibility that at some stage of the action a situation will arise necessitating the CONTROL of the ENTIRE force by ONE MIND if concord is to be had.---Sooner or later during the action a stage is likely to be reached where neither plan nor 'doctrine' is a guide.---Unity of action can be assured in such a case only by the ability of the commander-in-chief to take instant control of all the units of his fleet.-This is a very large order, of course- to fill it the commander-in-chief must be equipped with reliable means for communicating instantaneously with his subordinate commanders. A delay of five minutes may be fatal.--Scheer's "High Seas Fleet", p. 135- = In judging the proceedings it must be borne in mind that at sea a leader adapts his action to the events taking place around him... The art of leadership consists in securing an approximately correct picture from the impression of the moment, and then acting in accordance with it.'==H.C.Bywater (Naval Institute Vol 50 No 251, Jan 1, 1924 p 140-141.] "At the battle of Jutland the IRON DUKE occupied a station some distance down the line, a position which enabled -12- Admiral Jellicoe to observe the movements of his fleet as a whole more clearly than would have been possible from the van.Similarly, the FRIEDERICH DER GROSSE, carrying Admiral Scheer's flag,was at the outset of the action about midway down the German line.==Even so, neither commander-in-chief has as clear a view of the movements of his own and the enemy's fleet as was desirable. In fact at more than one stage of the battle, vision was so obscured by funnel, powder, and screening smoke that the maneuvers on both sides were rather in the nature of blind man's buff. With scores of ships all traveling at high speed and covering many square miles of sea, it would in any case have been out of the question for a single pair of eyes to follow every motion in an action lasting several hours, even if visibility had been perfect."--=="All the factors which rendered observation and intra-fleet communication so difficult at Jutland are likely to be magnified in a future naval action ---'The fundamental difference between combat on land and combat afloat- in the field, illimitable possibilities of concealment; at sea, a clear field of vision - has ceased to exist.'.==As regards the future and its requirements, it will never be possible to guarantee the absolute accuracy and rapidity of intra-fleet communicatrions. Conflicting reports from subordinates are and will be unavoidable; discrepancies in position can never be totally eliminated, despite the most careful plotting.==There is, therefore, but one way by which the commander-in-chief can make sure of his infomation, namely by seeing for himself, either with his own eyes or with those of his personal staff, who are fully apprised of his doubts and intentions. Should this prove impracticable, he must at any rate be in oral communication with those who can see what is going on. The most difficult and yet the most important requirement is that every development in the general situation shall be promptly observed and its significance accurately appreciated. This much is assured, there would be -13- no difficulty in communicating the necessary orders to the fleet, for the technical means of doing so functioned quite efficiently even at Jutland." == In the Naval Institute vol. 50, No. 253, March 1924, p. 516 from a review of Volume III, Corbett's "Naval Operations" made by Rear Admiral Twining, we read: == "A considerable part of the very real difficulty experienced by Admiral Jellicoe in locating the enemy battleships and deciding on a suitable deployment flowed directly from the initial errors of the reported two o'clock positions. == "The second fact is that of the almost total failure of the British communications. Important reports of position, contacts, and of character, bearing, and course of enemy vessels sighted or engaged were either not made at all or failed to get through in correct or intelligible form. In numerous cases, they were not recived at all. Although the unreliability of radio communication had been foreseen by the commander-in-chief, and orders had been given for maintaining visual contacts through linking vessels so far as possible, conditions did not facilitate observance of them, nor in any case does much effort seem to have been made to that end." == In the lecture by Captain A.W. Hinds, U.S.N. , we read: == "Just as Nelson on several occasions lost the enemy fleet through lack of information, so Admiral Jellicoe lost the opportunity to destroy the German High Sea Fleet at the Battle of Jutland through delayed and conflicting reports which amounted to a real LACK of positive accurate information.The damage done by this lack of information was intensified at two points - first, it delayed the deployment; seond, later on in the action, the British Battle Fleet lost touch with the Germans because Admiral Jellicoe did not know the German Fleet had turned away.The first lack of information cost the British a loss of sixteen minutes; the -14- SECOND, a loss of about twenty minutes, and as Nelson said: 'Time is everything. Five minutes makes the difference between a victory and a defeat.'"..== "Jutland shows that a whole fleet action may depend on timely, accurate information from contact scouting, correctly plotted and used by the Commander-in-Chief." == In the lecture "Naval Communications", Oct. 1923 by Commander Bingham, we read: "The histories of the World War, and I have in mind particularly those referring to the activities of the British Fleet, are filled with deficiencies of Communications." "During the battle of Jutland, one of the battle cruisers asked another battle cruiser in plain English for the recognition signals. A ship belonging to another Squadron intercepted the request and thought it was from a German ship." == In general the problem of communications is more difficult that formerly because the increased speed of maneuver has infinitely reduced the time available for communications and at the same time has increased the necessity for efficient communication == Methods in use for tactical communication include both visual and sound systems. == Visual methods include: flag hoists, wig-wag, semaphore, flashing light, signal searchlights by day; signal searchlight, yard arm blinker, blinker tube, Very signals, rockets or other pyrotechnics, and fixed lights by night. To these may be added (if sufficiently developed) the "invisible light ray" method by which rays of light of a certain wave length are used to transmit signals invisible except in the chosen direction and then only to be received by proper ray filter.== Sound signals include radio, radio phone, buzzer, submarine oscillator, whistle, siren, and signal guns. == Normally flag hoists, semaphore, and some form of radio communication are the primary methods by day,- signal searchlights, blinker, and radio by night. == -15- Proximity of the enemy or unusual visibility conditions will indicate modifications necessary whether for concealment or for getting message through despite adverse conditions.==For Day Battle, it seems likely that flag hoists, signal searchlights, semaphore, radio, radiophone,and oscillator will all be used.== By night,in presence of the enemy, "invisible ray", light signal, low power radio, pyrotechnics and fixed (capable of being turned on and off) battle signals will probably be used. == One use of large scale searchlights- to get a message through fog or smoke by day- should not be overlooked, particularly so in view of the danger of loss of radio equipment in battle.==It seems likely that methods of receiving radio can be made available to ships even after extensive destruction of facilities for transmission.== The principal use of the submarine oscillator is for communication with sub-surface vessels.== Normally tactical signals should go out simultaneously by at least two methods, if possible. Thus flag hoist, radio, and oscillator will probably be used by day to signal fleet change of approach formation. All surface ships will have flag hoist and radio receipt of the signal. SS will probably receive either radio or oscillator (direct or P.D.L.) or both.== Tactical communication presents the problem of handling a great number of simultaneous messages. In a general way communication follows the chain of command except that urgent messages such as contact reports must be gotten through as directly as possible.==The plan for inter-fleet communication is outlined in a recent publication by the Division of Communications as follows: == "The C-in-C is the focus of the radio system so far as a Fleet is concerned, and his communications must be given the paramount consideration. Messages to and from the C-in-C take precedence over other messages sent on the same wave" ...."Insofar as -16_ possible all ships guard the C-in-C's wave as well as that especially assigned to their own group of ships. The number of waves covered by the C-in-C is increased by the use of a guardship incompany with the C-in-C where visual signals may be used for relaying messages to the Flagship." ==The flagship covers as many waves as possible, and the guard ships care for the other group of waves for which they are detailed. Each force, task group and separate unit is assigned its wave length, and can thus communicate with the C-in-C, as well as with its own immediate superior.=="The Commander-in-Chief will control the radio communication of the fleet at all times.""Guard ships take the rank and have the control authority of the officer by whom they are detailed....Whenever a considered as controlling radio communication on a wave, it is to be understood that such ship..directs the progress of communication on that wave."


p 66-1176-- T-A-C-T-I-C-S thesis pp 16-25 of text


p.16 ., =The organization of communications on ships is outlined as follows:- = For battleships:- = The communication officer has general charge of all means of exterior communication in a battleship. He has as his assistants the Radio Officer and the Signal Officer. The Radio Officer has charge of all communication by radio, cable, telegraph, and by underwater sound apparatus. The Signal Officer has general charge of all communications by visual and by oral means. ... = The following stations for communications are installed in battleships: = VISUAL -: SIGNAL BRIDGE, BATTLE SIGNAL STATIONS, Nav. BRIDGE. =RADIO -: RADIO RECEIVING STATION, RADIO SENDING STATION, RADIO COMPASS, SOUND APPARATUS, EMERGENCY RADIO. = General -: COMMUNICATION OFFICE, CAPTAIN'S OFFICE, CODE ROOM. -p. 17 = There are four methods of sending by radio, but in tactical work it is probable that Broadcast or Receipt method will usually be the only methods needed. = General Signals [i.e. addressed to all ships in fleet, force, squadron, or other subdivision when sent out by the commander of the subdivision] will probably be sent simultaneously by visual and by sound. Execution signal will be similarly sent and obeyed as soon as received by either system. =Signals to a particular unit may be broadcasted or sent to require acknowledgement by one or more systems according to circumstances of the case at the time. =In general, the Flag or Commanding Officer of a ship is the point of origin or receipt for all messages by whatever system sent. = Interior communication circuits are provided within the ship for relaying or repeating signals as necessary to ensure prompt transmission from or receipt by the originator or recipient of the message. By these means the Radio, Signal, and Coding Facilities of the ship are directly connected to the directing intelligence of the ship. This arrangement supplemented by provision for possible casualties to personnel or materiel constitutes the communication organization of a single ship. = The method of assigning certain frequencies to certain groups in the fleet corresponds to assignment of circuits to personnel groups within a ship and so provides the organization of communication in the fleet. = Provision for casualties must provide for alternative use of other systems if radio be completely destroyed or for relaying or reassignment of frequencies if only partly disabled. = Existing instructions require use of visual or auxiliary methods when possible [W.I. 926] and, in use of radio, the lowest power consistent with getting the message through. = p. 18- In general, in battle, signals and communications should be as few as possible and as simple as possible. = Baudry says [p. 195]: ="When no signal is possible, or again, when none is expected, initiative is unavoidable. When a signal is flying, obedience is imperative. When it is read wrongly, or not at all, there are hesitation, muddle, and rout." -p 19- = [b.] USE OF MOORING BOARD, BATTENBERG COURSE INDICATOR, COURSE ANGLE CARDS. = The mooring board is used for graphic solution of problems arising in mooring and maneuvering fleets of vessels. = It consists of a series of concentric circles, ten in number,- the outer circle is graduated in degrees to indicate compass bearings,- the fifth circle is similarly graduated for reverse bearings. Radial lines for every ten degrees, and a series of N-S and E-W lines one inch apart complete the diagram. Suitable scales are provided 100 yards to an inch, 200 yards to an inch, 400 yards to an inch, and 500 yards to an inch, but as a general thing the one inch graduations on cardinal radii are used as one inch to 1,000 yards.This diagram is used to anchor or moor in a prescribed position relative to other vessels, to take station relative to a moving vessel, to make target approaches, and for graphic solution of torpedo problems. = The Battenberg course indicator is simply a mechanical means of obtaining solution of mooring board problems but does not cover all such problems completely. -=The Battenberg Course Indicator consists essentially of a circular plate graduated in degrees to show bearings and reciprocal bearings, two diameter grooves [on cardinal points] cross at right angles. = There are two position bars turning about a central pivot. These have sliding pointers, which may be clamped in desired position. One of these shows the observer's original position relative to the guide,- the other shows the new position desired. = Assuming the pivot to be the Guide Position, setting Position Bar pointer for new and old observer position for largest practicable scale,- then rotate circular plate untill grooves are parallel to line joining OLD and NEW position bar pointers. This closes triangle and shows relative motion. -p. 20- = A Guide Bar marked on the same scale as the Position Bars has on it a graduated circle,which can be moved along the bar and clamped at the speed of the guide.Attached to this circle is a Speed Bar marked on same scale.The pointer on this Speed Bar is set for speed of observer's ship. = The central pivot represents the original position of the guide,- position bars ares set for observer's old and new positions, - circular plate is rotated until grooves are parallel to line between pointers indicating observer's old and new positions. Then Guide Bar is clamped on course of Guide, graduated circle is moved to and clamped at guide's speed, - pointer on Speed Bar is set at speed of observer's ship. Then Speed Bar is swung around so that point comes to a diameter groove on the circular plate. A reading of graduated circle on guide bar then shows amount of course angle to right or left required to attain desitred position under assumed conditions of courses and speeds for guide and observer. = The Battenberg Indicator is used to take station on a moving ship, for target approach problems,in torpedo problems,and for other maneuvering problems. = Course angle cards are used to supplement the Mooring Board in maneuvering the formation. There are now three kinds of course angle cards:- Full speed course angle card, Standard speed course angle card, and Any speed course angle card. = These are diagrams on paper, cardboard, or celluloid intended to furnish convenient, quick solutions of maneuver problems regarding course and speed changes necessary to gain position promptly relative to other moving vessels.= These cards consist of a series of radial lines marked in degrees of course angle from old to new course, - vertical lines for orienting card properly on Mooring Board, and a series of dotted time lines to indicate time necessary to steer new course to gain desired position. -p. 21- = The old and new position are plotted on the Mooring Board, using center as positon of guide, and scale one inch equals 1,000 yards. Course angle card is then placed over Mooring Board, oriented by use of vertical lines, and amount of change of course and length of time necessary read from the card. = These cards in conjunction with the Mooring Board give quick solutions of problems involving one or more changes of course in changing position relative to a moving guide for cases not covered in detail by Instructions for Formations and Maneuvers of the Battrle Line. = All of these cards and the Battenberg Course Indicator also are aids in te use of the Mooring Board. = A data card is also furnished, which contains data for conversion of times at fifteen knots to times at other speeds, for adjusting speed during approach so as to gain resultant position equivalent to that which would be gained by a given course angle without change of speed, and table of times for completing turns of various amounts at fifteen knots. = The course finder is an instrument for determination of enemy course and bearing, collision course, and firing course for torpedo firing, from known course of own vessel and enemy bearing, - and is provided for the use of submarines inmaking attack. -p. 22- = III. TACTICS OF TYPES. [a.] BATTLESHIPS. = In Scheer's report after Jutland [Scheer's "Germany's High Seas Fleet", p. 168, ] we read : = "All arms can claim a share in the success. But, directly or indirectly, the far-reaching heavy artillery of the great battleships was the deciding factor, and caused the greater part of the enemy's losses that are so far known, as also it brought the torpedo boat flotillas to their successful attack on the ships of the Main Fleet. This does not detract from the merits of the flotillas in enabling the battleships to slip away from the enemy by their attack. The big ship - battleship and battle cruiser is therefore, and will be, the main strength of naval power." = In Naval Institute, Vol. 49, No. 250 [Dec.1923] , p.2073, Captain McNamee, U.S.N. said: " I have been in the Navy thirty-five years, and I have seen the battleship put out of business on paper many times. First there was the ram. ... Then came the torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the submarine that were to sink it with a torpedo costing only a few thousand dollars; then the Zeppelin and now the airplane bomber, that are to shower destruction upon it from the sky.But the old battleship, like the old flag, is still there. Every new form of attack has developed a corresponding defense, and the battleship still stands, the backbone of every country's naval defense." = Baudry in "The Naval Battle", p. 27, classes naval vessels under two heads: "Vessels of the line, or armored vessels. Light or unarmored vessels." He says further: "The term 'vessels of the line' is restricted to armored ships because in the present condition of naval materiel,they alone can normally keep their place in a LINE fighting with guns." = We have seen, under "I." [Tactical Principles] above, that "the decisive point will normally be the enemy battle line."= In "The NAVAL BATTLE" [W.C. 1240/6-23] we read [p. 10] : "Necessities of design give heavy ships their maximum hitting p. 23- power when firing on or near the beam, hence in sea battles heavy ships naturally take a formation approximating to column and endeavor to hold the enemy about abeam and under the fire of all heavy guns.. The most advantageous position one battle line can gain over another is the "capping" or "T" position by which that line is in a position to fire its full broadside against the enemy,- while the enemy can reply with only the end-on fire of his nearest ships. = The position EQUALLY favorable to each of two engaged battle lines is when they are abeam of each other. The "T" position being so overwhelmingly advantageous, eah battle line endeavors to obtain it for itself, or to approximate it as nearly as possible, while preventing the enemy from doing anything of the kind, and for this reason we have as the first principle of battleship tactics that of keeping one's own line always normal to the bearing of the center of the enemy's line." = "The battle line that draws ahead of the other and keeps itself perpendicular to a line from its center ship to the nearest enemy ship while doing so, not only has its full broadside bearing on the enemy line but also, and at the same time, reduces the number of enemy guns that can be brought to bear or kept within range." = There follows a discussion of the "turn away" by the slower fleet to avoid being "capped" with resultant danger of a "knuckle" permitting enemy concentration of ships in the van while rear is out of range. It is also noted that, lacking speed superiority sufficient to gain a capping position, use may be made of a "fast wing", torpedo attack, or floating mines to force a "turn away." = Further on p. 35 we find "Remembering that the foundation on which the work of any fleet is built is its heavy battle line and that when the enemy's battle line is broken or destroyed, his whole fighting structure will crumble, it is evident that the main or primary objective of all parts of a fleet in battle is the opposing battle line. Every part of the fleet that can hit that line a blow -p. 24- must do so at the earliest possible moment and must keep hitting it with its full strengh as long as the line exists and blows can be struck agsinst it." = On p. 37 reference is made to elements that influence tactics, as follows: "These points and the bearing they have on tactics will now be discussed under the headings [1] the weather gauge, gas and spray; [2] Roll and pitch; [3] Light, sun glare, silhouette; [4] Surprise; [5] Time; [6] Smoke and smoke tactics; [7] Preparation before battle." = All these are of general application to the various types of ships. = As a general proposition, the weather gauge imposes smoke and funnel gas interference upon gunfire of the battleships having the weather gauge [particularly so in case of coal-burning vessels]. On the other hand, the ships to leeward suffer from spray and interference from splashes of enemy "shorts". However, insofar as battleships alone are concerned, it seems probable that usually the weather gauge will be disadvantageous.= Roll and pitch will affect gunfire, but a moderate roll will not be undesirable for capital ships firing by director. Pitch and yaw will adversely affect gunfire.= Sun-glare, silhouette, and light will also affect gunfire favorably or otherwise according to existing conditions. The element of surprise is uncertain and may brought about in any of a great many ways. = The element of TIME is of great importance. Nelson said, "Time is everything." Another - probably Napoleon- said, "Frappez vite et frappez fort." On the old theory that the best protection is a "well directed fire" against the enemy, it is obvious that every salvo that lands on a enemy before his salvos begin to land on us will tend to decrease the weight, i.e. number of projectiles, of his fire before it begins to become effective. -p. 25-= Smoke tactics are yet of doubtful utility for battleships.If future development of smoke projectiles or aircraft smoke screens will offer facilities for blanketing off part of the enemy battleships force in order to concentrate gunfire on the remainder, its use may be highly important, but that point have not yet been reached practically. = It remains to consider what means are available to battleships to destroy an opposing formation of enemy battleships. = In general all combatant vessels have mobility and destructive power. In the publication "The Naval Battle" [ War .College. 1240-6-23 ], the characteristics of battleships are indicated thus: "[1] Battleships, of great size, medium speed, heavy armor, MANY heavy guns, and several airplanes." = Battleships are usually equipped with some torpedos, but even though these may be of service in inflicting serious damge upon enemy units, the primary weapon the battleship is the big gun. = It is evident therefore that battleship tactics must primarily be based upon speed, i.e. ability to manuever, and gun -i.e. ability to inflict damage. = Baudry's "The Naval Battle" , particularly the "Third Study - The Gun in Battle", discusses various effects of concentration, division of fire, natural and artificial fire distribution, formations, and effect of fire. The War College publications "Fire Distribution, Formations, and Positions", and "The Fire Effect Tables" furnish valuable data along these lines. = Accepting the theory that the battle line of major ships will normally be the decisive point in the battle, it follows that concentration upon the battle line as the primary objective is normally sound tactics.Further, adapting principles accepted for land warfare, to disorganize the opposing battle line, two methods are available, i.e. [1] to pierce the line by frontal attack, [2] to envelop [or turn] the line by a flank movement or attack. - p. 26- For either [1] or [2] both maneuver


w1177 p 66 TACTICSjbb p26-35


-26- For either [1] or [p2] both maneuver and destructive power are useful, the exact relative value of each depending on details of existing conditions. = Concentration of fire upon a central portion of the enemy line and concentration of effort by auxiliary light craft upon the enemy center will tend to disorganize enemy formation, throw rear into confusion,and divide enemy forces. = Concentration of fire upon van or rear corresponds to a heavy attack upon one flank. There appears to be considerable variance of opinion as to whether van or rear is normally the better flank upon which to concentrate.= Bellair's "Battle of Jutland" p. 156 said: "It is the golden rule in tactics that, whatever else lets go, the van should hold, and as the enemy turns, turn with him." = On the other hand, Mahan points out that it takes longer for the van to come around to assist the rear than for the rear to come up to assist the van. = Corresponding maneuvers would be [1] The "charge through" to break through the enemy line. [2] A circling movement by van or rear to threaten enfilade and thus either force the enemy to maneuver or compel him to accept enfilade in order to retain his line of battle intact. = Lacking opportunity to study details of these methods,it remains to determine just what principles are acceptable for battleship tactics. =Section XII of War Instructions [1923] lays down clearly the basic considerations for distribution of fire, effect of maneuver, smoke, sea, sun, and spray, normal fire distribution of fire both with and without air spot, and use of secondary battery in repelling destroyer attack.= The basic principle is that "every vessel in the enemy battle line and within effective range is kept under gun fire." p 27-= Natural and artifical concentration are indicated as normally to be made use of to gain superiority at the critical point [Number of ships concentrating on a single enemy ship not to exceed three.] After consideration of effect of changes of course or speed in reducing effective gun fire and consideration of effect of smoke, sea, sun, and spray, the following general principles for fire distribution are laid down [except as modified for use of air spot] : = [a] The division will be the unit for fire distribution. =[b] When there is no advantage of position, and the enemy is superior or inferior in numbers, the fire section of divisions will be so assigned as to bring our heavier fire on one or both enemy flanks.= [c] When there is no advantage of position, and the enemy is equal in numbers, the fire section of each division will normally be equal, but may be made to correspond exactly with the number of ships in each of our divisions, if such divisions differ materially in numerical strength. [d] Fire sections will be so assigned that no enemy vessel in position to be effectively attacked shall be left unengaged, and so that none of our ships shall be required to divide fire between more than two targets. = [e] Any assignment of fire sections, or any special concentration may be directed in order to take advantage of a favorable situation. Division commanders will control the fire distribution of their divsions in accordance with the above general principles of fire distribution, the rules and signals of the general signal book, and the following gneral instructions:= [f] All ships of the division fire section will be kept under fire. = [g] Advantage will be taken to concentrate on a flagship, on a vessel making a turn, and of other favorable opportunities to damage the enemy. = -p. 28-a turn, and of other favorable opportunities to damage the enemy. = -p. 28- [h] Where there is no particular favorable target, each division will use the normal fire distribution of the general signal book. = [i] If for any cause an enemy ship between the fire sections of adjacent divisions appears to be unengaged, the commander of the division nearer the center of our formation shall include such ship in the fire division of his division. Where the two divisions concerned are equally near the center, the right division (when facing the enemy) will be responsible for such enemy ship. = [j] If a division commander sights the enemy within range before the rest of the battle line can do so, he will select targets for his division, make the fire distribution signal, and open fire, addressing such signals ":for information" to the other division commanders, and the O.T.C. commanders of other divisions, as they come into action, will assign targets to their divisions so as to carry the fire up and down the line, leaving no enemy ship unengaged. The resulting fire distribution will remain in effect until another distribution is ordered by the O.T.C. = [k] If a flank division is attacked by a detached fast wing, the division commander concerned will, at his discretion shift fire to meet the attack, informing the commander of the adjacent division and the commander of the battle line, who will reassign fire sections as necessary. = 1210. Under the condition of low visibility, or of considerable confusion in the latter phases of an engagement, fleet or division control of fire may be impracticable. Under such conditions captains in selecting targets will give preference to enemy vessels on the general bearing line, if practicable; but will use their discretion in selecting the most suitable target. = 1211. Division commanders may divert part of the main batteries to repel torpedo attack, but such measures should be primarily defensive. = -p.29- There follow instructions permitting use of anti-aircraft batteries at the discretion of commanding officers and providing for modification of fire distribution instructions when using air spot. = Further instructions govern details of controlling fire of secondary battery in repelling torpedo craft. = Section XXIX gives detailed instruction as to deployment. The basic rule is that "When deployment is completed, the bearing of the center of the enemy battle line should be approximately normal to the line of bearing of our battle line." = Section XXX, Paragraph 3000-3002, contains essential instructions as to basic plan for normal engagement: "The greatest importance is attached to making full use of the fire of heavy guns in the early stages of an action. Every endeavor shall be made bring all divisions into action simultaneously. = Under normal conditions, the O.T.C. will maintain the line of bearing of the battle line normal to the bearing of the center of the enemy battle line from the center of our battle line, assisted by such action of the division commanders as may be necessary to carry out his directions as to the course and line of bearing. = Division commanders are authorized so to station the vessels of their divisions in conformity with the general plan, as to obtain the maximum efficiency from their batteries." = In general, the division is the unit in battleship battle maneuvers, and on deployment an approximate column is formed normal to bearing of enemy [battle line] center. = To close or open range or to vary target angle in order to reduce probable penetrative effect of enemy shell, normal "battle formations" provide for line-of-bearing-of-division guides with division axis at angle of fifteen or thirty degrees to right or left of axis of battle line. = Division and ship commanders are permitted necessary action to avoid immediate danger of mines or torpedoes, or to change range, if being heavily hit. =--p.30- In general it is essential that such action be minimized and that all effort be made to retain full effect of main battery against enemy battle line without interruption even though freed to take action against lighter craft at same time. = [b] LIGHT CRUISERS: = Light cruisers should normally be disposed on engaged side in van and rear by the time the major action begins. [Prior to this time, i.e., during the approach, the light cruisers may well have been used for tactical scouting.] = "The NAVAL BATTLE" [War College 1240-6-23] p. 14, says: "The counter to heavy ships' attack is generally made by heavy ships, but the counter to the attacks of destroyers and light mine layers is made by ships of the cruiser type,- by battle cruisers from their positions as fast wings, and by light cruisers, which have the speed of destroyers but very much heavier batteries. Hence on the extreme flanks of an engaged battle fleet, even beyond the destroyers, we place light cruisers whose mission it is to cover their own light craft in their attacks at the same time that they protect their own heavy ships against the attacks of enemy light craft. With this disposition and use of the light cruiser type in our minds,we have before us the broad general plan and principles for using surface craft for attacking enemy heavy ships while protecting one's own." = This undoubtedly has the disadvantage of any dual role in battle, unless one role be made paramount by doctrine or division of light cruisers for use offensively and defensively be made. = It appears logical to consider that, in view of principle of concentration of maximum force at the critical point and the normal consideration of enemy battle line as the decisive point, the use of the light cruisers for protecting own heavy ships from enemy light craft is more important than their support of own lighter craft. =-p.31- = Therefore light cruisers should be disposed in van and rear primarily to deny enemy light craft access to positions necessary for attacks upon battle line. = This will not prevent their rendering assistance to own light craft so far as is compatible with their primary duty of denying enemy craft access to positions for attack. = If, however, sufficient numbers of light cruisers are available to permit detail of certain light cruisers specifically for the support of destroyer attacks against the enemy line, the primary objective of such light cruisers will of course be such forces as oppose the destroyer attack.= The effect of weather, roll, pitch, yaw, gas, spray, light, and smoke will have considerable effect upon the gunfire of light cruisers, while the effect of weather and lee gauge will be much more masked than in the case of larger ships. = "The Naval Battle", p. 7, states: "Light cruisers which carry intermediate guns and torpedoes, have a dual role, - the torpedo being the primary weapon against the capital ships, and the gun primary against light ships." =Light cruisers, when not plentiful, may well have been rather widely scattered for scouting tactically during the approach. This may well impose a considerable handicap upon their efforts to take stations for battle. = In the engagement proper, the light cruisers must deny enemy light craft access to torpedo water [i.e. favorable position for firing torpedoes] and assist own lighter craft [destroyers] to gain such access to torpedo water for attacking enemy battle line. = The exact positions to be gained will vary according to range of light cruiser battery, range of enemy torpedoes, range of battleship secondary batteries, direction of wind and sea. = Generally light cruisers in the van should be in sector about twenty [20] degrees from ahead around toward enemy, working in close tactical concentration with other light forces in the van to deny enemy -p. 32- -p. 32- torpedo water and to support own torpedo craft advancing to attack enemy line. For existing types it is probable that a position about five miles fifteen degrees on engaged bow of battle line will serve this purpose. = Rear light cruisers should be disposed on engaged quarter, at approximately the same distance [five miles] from own battle line to cover engaged quarter from astern to broad on the quarter. = For torpedo attacks against enemy line, light cruisers should seek positions on engaged bow and quarter of enemy. Exact loci of such positions will also depend on range of own torpedos, range of enemy guns, and weather conditions. = [c] DESTROYERS Use of Smoke Screens, Methods of Launching Destroyer Attacks, Methods of Firing Torpedoes. = Destroyers have high speed, numerous torpedoes, no armor, and a few minor calibre guns. Their primary function is the delivery of torpedo attacks against enemy battle line. [The mobility and light draft of destroyers permits their use as anti-submarine screens, but this is in the nature of a makeshift arrangement, as there is little doubt that the destroyer is less useful for the purpose of anti-submarine screening than a vessel without torpedoes and with more extensively developed anti-submarine engagement would be. Other makeshift uses of destroyers are not uncommon, but this does not change their primary function.] = Normally in a daylight major engagement, all efforts of destroyers should be directed towards performance of their primary mission - the destruction of enemy capital ships- and as little energy should be dissipated in action against other types as is practicable in performance of Mission.= To quote "The Naval Battle" [War College 1240-6-23] p. 36: "Submarines of a fleet must fight their way through any oposition tending to hold them from the main objective, but they must never do so at the expense of that objective. Destroyers that can attack the main objective should never stop their attack to enter - p. p. 33- a melee with other destroyers or light forces trying to hold them off...." "All commanders in a fleet must always know what the primary objective is and keep before them the fact that nothing they do will count for much if it draws them from that objective before it has been gained." = The principal weapon of destroyers is the torpedo, guns being used only for purposes subordinate to the primary task of torpedoing enemy capital ships.= As stated in War College 330-4-5 Mod. 1 [the Destroyer, etc. ] p. 5:"when not protected by the gunfire of major ships, the destroyers, to enjoy fair chances of success, must be protected by its high speed, or by the cover of darkness or of smoke, or by both." = In the same publication, pp. 18-20 we read: "In daylight the difficulties of estimating course and speed of the enemy are somewhat less than by night; the distance can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, and a perfectly clear and definable target is presented. = The chief difficulties confronting the destroyer by day are those of : = [1] Attaining a position favorable to torpedo fire. = [2] Getting within torpedo range without being destroyed by gunfire. = If the enemy is free to maneuver in any direction and is not threatened by any other force, it is quite possible for him to prevent the destroyers from reaching a favorable position,- that is - one from which at long range, torpedoes could be effectively fired. The destroyers would still have the advantage [option?] of approaching to shorter range and firing torpedoes from a less favorable position, but such an attack would undoubtedly result in severe losses unless the protection of a smoke screen were available. = It may, therefore, be accepted as a general theorem, that - UNSUPPORTED DESTROYER ATTACK BY DAY ON MAJOR SHIPS IS UNWISE UNLESS SMOKE SCREEN TACTICS CAN BE USED. = -p 34- =An exception to the general case may be noted in the special case of the enemy being obliged for navigational reasons to pursue a certain course. In such case the destroyers, by placing themselves ahead of the enemy, might make an effective attack while still at such a distance as to be reasonably safe from gunfire.= "The form of attack that will usually commend itself to a Commander-in-Chief is that in which the destroyer force cooperates with the main fighting force in a day engagement. In this case the enemy is no longer free to maneuver at will to avoid the torpedo threat, since the main fighting force has also to be reckoned with; nor is he free to employ all his offensive power against the destroyers; on the contrary the major portion of it must be directed against the capital ships opposed to him, and in general, only the secondary batteries can be used against the destroyers. These guns and their personnel are meanwhile exposed to the fire of the capital ships opposed to them, and their effectiveness, if not totally destroyed, will be greatly reduced. ="To derive the fullest advantage from this force of attack, the destroyer attack must be made simultaneously with or after the main body attack. If it is made too soon,the destroyers incur the chance of destruction without inflicting serious damage. If too long deferred, either the main body will have already won the action, or will have suffered so much damage that it can no longer support the destroyers effectively. In the first case, destroyer attack is unnecessary. In the second case, the enemy may win by defeating our forces in detail. = "It is admittedly a matter of no small difficulty for a Commander-in- Chief so to coordinate the movements of the several forces of his fleet as to insure simultaneity of attack --- when the number of destroyers is large, there seem to be good reasons for employing them in three detachments, one on either flank of the enemy and one with the main body. One or the other of the flanking detachments may attack the enemy's van, no matter which -p. 35- way he turns, while the detachment with the main body can be launched against the enemy's line at a critical moment to force him to maneuver or to cover our own maneuver. A study of the Battle of Jutland seems to show that on at least two occasions the German forces were used for the purpose last named."= SMOKE SCREENS: = The use of smoke screens tactically is discussed in War College 330-415-Mod. 1 [The Destroyer, etc.] p. 31 et seq. : = Uses of Smoke Screen. = The destroyer smoke screen has three principal uses - = [1] To protect the destroyers in attack, =[2] To Mask a maneuver, =[3] To isolate a portion of the enemy. = [1] As all attacks under cover of a smoke screen must be made from windward, it will be assumed that destroyers by their superior speed could gain this position and would start laying the screen from a point beyond gun range, choosing a course and speed that would give the desired smoke angle. = There are three principal cases:= [1] The attack is to be made by the screen-laying destroyers., [2] The attack is to be made by a separate destroyer force operating behind the screen. = [3] A combination of [1] and [2]. = In all cases an observing boat preferably ahead or on the enemy's line of bearing and in sight of screen-laying destroyers should observe and constantly report the enemy's formation, course, and speed. The distance and bearing of the enemy leader should also be reported. =In considering the use of destroyers operating in conjunction with a smoke screen, it is believed entirely practicable for boats concealed from the enemy but in sight of each other to successfully fire torpedoes under direction of the leading boat if the leader - p. 36-


p 66-1178 Jack Barrett TACTICS THESIS 1924 Naval War College Newport RI p 36-51


direction of the leading boat if the leader - p. 36- TACTICS thesis Jack Barrett p 36-51 -p.36-himself is in sight of the enemy. All boats should already, from information received from the leader or from the observing boat, have knowledge of the course,speed, and formation of the enemy. If the leader signals the bearing and distance of the enemy leading ship,each boat should have all necessary information for firing her torpedoes at such an angle that they would pass inside the limits of the enemy's formation. Great accuracy is not required,where the fire is directed against a long formation. = METHODS of LAUNCHING DESTROYER ATTACK. = By day, destroyer attacks are made as an open attack, a massed attack, or in a special smoke screen formation. = The open attack is normally used for an unsupported attack, - has the advantage of requiring the enemy to divide fire in order to cover many targets in various directions - but has the disadvantages that it requires more time to prepare, reduces facility in coordinating action of all units, and is not well adapted for use of smoke screen tactics. The usual formation for open attack is a line of section or division guides approximately normal to the line of fire. = The massed attack will normally be used in coperation with heavier ships for a supported attack. The squadron is the usual unit,approach being made in line of division columns,- outer divisions turning in opposite directions as torpedoes are fired, and center division following one of the flank divisions. This form of attack is comparatively simple, renders coordination less difficult than open attack and simplifies control of te squadron during the approach. = Special smoke screen formations are used whenever practicable under conditions such that use of smoke screen will not interfere with our own main body. Use of smoke screen formations is particularly requisite in unsupported attacks. = -p.37- In general, it is particularly to be desired that attacks be so timed that as many torpedoes as possible reach enemy line simultaneously. If this is not practicable, attacks should follow each other in as close succession as possible,. = Baudry's "NAVAL BATTLE', p. 371 says: = "The day will come when a great admiral, with no more than equal forces, will successfully bring a concentration of all his means to bear upon one point of his adversary's array, by putting both his concentrated artillery and his torpedo vessels simultaneously into action. That admiral will and must be victorious." = The Manual "DESTROYER WAR INSTRUCTIONS - 1923", p. 179, lays down certain principles governing destroyer attacks. The following excerpts are considered worthy of special emphasis: = 2442 "In an attack on the engaged side of the enemy battle line, the preferred torpedo firing position for destroyers is in the area from thirty to sixty degrees on the engaged bow." = 2443 "In an attack from ahead, destroyers should, if practicable, gain firing positions ahead and on both bows, or failing that, such positions that the torpedo tracks will cross each other at a large angle." = 2444 "Having reached a favorable position, , every destroyer should fire all its torpedoes before retiring." = 2445 "Smoke screens will be employed as cover for the attacking destroyers when practicable." =METHODS OF FIRING TORPEDOES = Torpedoes can be fired by use of tubes as FIXED or MOVABLE tubes, but in general the use of fixed tubes for firing by director will be normal for fleet actions. = Furthermore, single shots, aimed or "browning" shots, are not likely to be as effective generally as salvos of "browning" shots, preferably so fired as to "criss cross" at the approximate range of the enemy battle line. = -p.38- += The torpedo director is set for enemy's estimated speed and provides mechanical solution of the relative motion of the target and torpedo so that when director telescope is "on", tube is offset for correct amount to allow for run of torpedo and advance of target, plus or minus dispersion to be used to get "spread";- when at desired firing point ship is turned to firing course for which director has been set and torpedoes fired - ship then swung around to firing course for second broadside, and with director "on" for this firing course, offset, a dispersion angle, a second broadside is fired. = The squadron [or other unit] leader normally determines firing point and signals time for turn from approach to firing course. This firing course will normally have been designated early enough to allow torpedo director to be set and tubes clamped ready to fire as soon as the turn has been completed.In general the firing range should be as short as possible, continuing the approach until enemy shells begin to hit. = For coordinated attack, the leader chooses point of aim, sets torpedo speed on torpedo bar of director, points sight bar at point of aim, sets enemy course and speed [knots] on enemy bar, notes compass bearing of torpedo bar, - signals to other ships of group:- The compass bearing that his own torpedo bar will be on when signal "Fire Torpedoes" is executed,- signals firing course, number of torpedoes to be fired, and signal to "fire torpedoes." = This may be varied by signal enemy course and speed to be used, then permitting each ship to fire own torpedoes by use of its own director or as aimed shots using tubes as semi-fixed or movable tubes. = In low visibility, short ranges, or in case of surprise independent firing by units may be used. = p. 39- [d] LIGHT MINE LAYERS, USE OF ANCHORED and FLOATING MINES. = As stated in "WAR INSTRUCTIONS, 1923" p. 120: The mission in battle of the light mine layer attached to or operating with the battle fleet is - = [a] To lay mines tactically as directed; or = [b] To mine particular areas as directed. = In battle, mines may be laid ahead of the enemy battle line to force a countermarch, or change of course to either close or open the range. The light mine layers may be directed to lay mines to cover a retirement by our battle line or in advance of the probable line of retirement of the enemy battle line. Particular areas will be mined as directed. --- Normally the light mine layers will be equally distributed between the van and rear. = After deployment the light mine layers in the van normally should take station about twenty-five to thirty thousand yards ahead of the battle line and fifteen degrees on the engaged bow. = The light mine layers in the rear should take such station that they will be in position to mine ahead of the enemy battle line if it countermarches; normally about twenty thousand yards on the engaged quarter of the enemy battle line. = In reduced visibility, these intervals may be reduced. = It is also specified that mines are not to be laid in battle area except as directed by Commander-in- Chief; - that plan is carefully followed, and necessary information of location of mines be furnished Commander-in-Chief and own forces. = Use of smoke screens to cover mine laying operations is also directed to be made as needed, provided it does not interfere with own battle line. = There are two kinds of mines: - = Anchored mines [controlled or contact type] and floating mines. = Anchored mines of the controlled type are used for coast and harbor defences, being fired from a central station when an enemy ship is observed to be over the position where the mine is anchored. p. 40-These can usually be set, if desired, so as to become automatic, i.e. contact mines. = Anchored mines of the contact types are used to defend own waters, to obstruct channels used by enemy, or tactically in action when in water shoal enough for the purpose.These are usually electrically fired by closing the circuit when contact with vessel occurs. = Anchored mines can usually be swept up if sufficient force is not at hand to prevent sweeping operations, but ground mines are difficult to sweep for, and dormant mines cannot ordinarily be swept out until fixed period of time [during which mine remains on bottom] has elapsed. = Paravane gear has proved very effective in reducing danger from anchored mines. = All anchored mines are designed to become inoperative when adrift from mooring. = Floating mines are small mines used for tactical purposes. These are very sensitive, often laid in pairs with connecting wire to ensure contact even though nearer mine be deflected by ship's bow wave. These are usually supported by small buoys, or by self-contained mechanism producing vertical motion at intervals sufficiently short to keep mine within certain limits of depth. = The Hague Convention of 1907 requires floating mines to be designed so as to become inoperative one hour after being laid. This rule has not been strctly adhered to in practice. = Floating mines may be used to damage a pursuing enemy fleet, to force enemy to maneuver to avoid real or dummy mines with resulting reduction of his effective fire, to deter enemy from avoiding torpedo attack from another direction, to delay a retreating fleet, or to disorganize an enemy formation at night preliminary to or during some other form of attack. = -p. 41- Tactical mining is usually done by a group of ships in line [400 to 500 yards distance]. Almost any type of ship can be used, but in view of need for speed in attaining position in time, light mine layers of destroyer type afford most desirable characteristics of any regular type of ships now in use. = Line of bearing [not less than 45 degrees] usually in line abeam, is best mine laying formation and permits very rapid laying of extensive line or lines of mines. = SUBMARINES - IN SCOUTING AND IN ATTACK. = As stated in "WAR INSTRUCTIONS, 1923" page 125: "The mission in battle of submarines, when operating with the fleet as an attack group, is - = To attack and destroy enemy major ships." = The same publication further indicates that: submarines seeking to attack enemy major ships should not endanger success by action against other types unless exceptional reasons exist; that use of submarines in battle will be difficult because of slow speed and limited endurance submerged; that most favorable time for submarine attack will be during or immediately after deployment. Preferably torpedoes from submarines should arrive at the enemy line simultaneously with those from destroyers or as nearly so as may be practicable.= Since submarines can rarely move with speed as great as that of the battle line, even on the surface, it is evident that submarines must be placed prior to engagement in general direction towards enemy line,. using surface speed as much as practicable during approach, submerging as screening vessels pass over,then cautiously periscoping for brief periods, then if clear resuming surface conditon; otherwise continuing approach submerged. = Since approximate deployment course is determined by relative bearings of own and enemy main body, the direction of enemy advance immediately after deployment can usually be determined fairly closely as in a given direction or its reverse. Since there is always -p. 42- a possibility of a countermarch, it is obvious that to be sure that some submarines get into favorable position ahead of enemy, submarines should be divided and placed out along the estimated deployment course and its reverse at sufficient distance to be sure that one or the other group will be ahead of enemy line in whichever direction it advances. = To cover possible changes of course made by enemy line to open or close the range or for other reasons, such as evasion of mines or torpedoes, submarines in both van and rear should be disposed well to either side of enemy course. If enemy maintained a steady course, the problem of penetration to firing position would be fairly simple, but with constant changes of course of the enemy line, the problem of attaining a favorable firing position becomes very difficult. = SCOUTING: The ability to conceal itself gives the submarine a very real advantage for scouting, and there can be no doubt that use of submarines for strategic scouting can be very effective. = The use of submarines for tactical scouting offers some advantages because of the ability of submarines to remain unseen, but since tactical scounting requires prompt forwarding of information obtained, the probable early location of scouts by enemy use of radio bearings as scouts use radio to forward information indicates that use of submarines for tactical scouting is only practicable if such submarine scouts can be spared for scouting only and definetly discarded for attack purposes. Even if so assigned for tactical scouting, the generally slow speed of submarines in comparison with surface types makes it doubtful if submarines can adequately perform tactical scouting duties alone. They can, however, penetrate closer to enemy than surface types without being detected and so may well form outer fringe of tactical scouting force, retiring to protection of surface types if forced to do so. = "War Instructions 1923" p. 78 [2233-2234] lays down principles for use of submarines in scouting as follows: =-p. 43-"= When submarines are avaialble for use in scouting operation, they should as a rule be assigned to fixed areas for the purpose of observation or disposed across that route upon which early information of the enemy is most essential. = If the primary mission of submarines is that of obtaining information, they should avoid observation by the enemy screen and avoid attacking enemy units unless favorable opportunity for attack against important enemy vessels is presented. In such circumstances, the submarine commander should bear in mind that the usefulness of his vessl as a gatherer of information may be impaired by enemy counter action,and must carefully consider the relative value to our fleet of continued information and of the damage to the enemy which is likely to result from his attack." = From results on the game board it seems likely that use of submarines as the only scouts against an enemy fleet of normal characteristics attended by light forces is not likely to furnish information of sufficient value to offset their necessary diversion from their attack function unless a great preponderance of submarines justifies such diversion. It does seem quite likely, however, that for trailing a slow moving fleet with its train or for trailing a convoy, submarines may be highly efficient, particularly at night. = Such trailing at night by submarines close to enemy might well be used,- information to be passed along by oscillation to submarine or surface craft more remote from convoy, and by it forwarded to destroyer or other attack unit preparing to deliver a night attack. = In general, however, it seems probable that submarines will be more useful for strategic scouting operations than for tactical scouting. =-Since, however, use of submarines in a major action requires placing of submarines far out from main body prior to deployment, it may well be that submarines will be of value for early contact scouting - to be discontinued as soon as surface scouts make contact p. 44 unless very special circumstances appear to justify a submarine contact in forwarding vitally important information. = The crux of the matter seems to be that submarines are designed to destroy enemy capital ships and should not be diverted from their mission of sinking capital ships for any less important purpose. = SUBMARINES IN ATTACK: Of the various types of submarines, the fleet submarines [SF and OSF] and first line submarines [SS] are most likely to be used in a major engagement. SMs of sufficient speed should, if present, be of considerable value, but generally SMs are usually slow and primarily intended for mine laying in enemy home waters.= Torpedos are the primary weapons of the SF and SS types. Bow tubes are usual, some units, particularly foreign, have stern or beam tubes in addition.Torpedoes may be fired by turning submarine to a firing course that will bring torpedo exactly "on" for firing, but in general "angle fire" will be quicker and more certain for any except perhaps "bow tube" shots. Since submarines generally have comparatively low speed while submerged, as much of the approach as possible should be made in a surface condition. = After being forced to submerge, periscope should be used carefully, with as short a period of exposure as will serve the immediate purpose of periscoping. = Skillful use of hydrophones during the approach will be a valuable adjunct to periscope operations. = In general submarines should appraoch within short range of their target before firing torpedoes, preferably from 500 to 3000 yards. = The normal practice will be for attacking submarine or section of submarines to parallel enemy course while in position ahead, heading on same course or on reverse course, then fire when enemy comes within range. If certain for any reason, such as navigational dangers, mine fields, or developments of the major action, that -p. 45 - enemy is not likely to change course soon, it will probably be preferable for submarine [or section] to steer approximately the same course as the enemy, sheering in as necessary to reach close range or out if necessary to avoid being cut down, slow to steerage way to let anti-submarine screen pass over without detection, and fire when enemy line comes in range. This method prolongs period of observation by slowing rate of closing of enemy [difference of speeds of enemy and submarines] and thus permits more exact attainment of desired firing position beore enemy closes. = Steering a course which is the reverse of that of the enemy line decreases time for closing to firing range and so decreases time available for adjusting position relative to enemy beore firing, but, if there is danger that enemy may soon change course and so evade slow-movng submarines, this decrease of time [or increase in rate of closing sum of own and enemy speeds] will tend to ensure reaching firing position even though more hurriedly than on the same course as the enemy. = In either case, as firing point is approached, submarines must choose between turning so as to bring torpedo tubes to bear directly towards desired track of torpedo before firing or set gyros for "angle" necessary for angle fire for firing course to be used. = Most favorable track angle will depend upon whether enemy course or enemy speed is least well known. If both are equally doubtful, a track angle of ninety to one hundred degrees will be desirable.Offset and dispersion will be calculated as for surface vessels. = The section approach should bring section to firing point approximately parallel to enemy line so that there may be no interference with torpedo fire of units and so that fire may be distributed along enemy line. = The section leader should signal when about to fire so that the section may fire torpedoes as nearly as possible simultaneously.-p. 46- = After the attack, since submarines are most liable to discovery at the moment of firing, submarines should make a radical change of course and attempt to evade counter attack by anti-submarine forces. = It seems probable that such evasion of counter attack may be made as well by diving under enemy battle line to resume attack on opposite side as by any other method - particularly so in view of fact that enemy line itself will serve to delay and disrupt pursuit by anti-submarine forces. = Since submarine forces cannot make sufficient speed to maintain positions relative to own battle line, their chief concern is normally to place themselves favorably in RELATION TO ENEMY BATTLE LINE. For this reason their movements are usually independent of movements of own fleet but depend very much upon knowledge of enemy movements. = Their approach to attack positions can therefore be greatly facilitated by a steady flow of infornation as to position, course, and speed of enemy main body. This information should be furnished by surface vessels when practicable at frequent intervals.If not so furnished, submarines must get it as best they can. Obviously, if practicable for any surface vessel to do so, information should be sent out for such use by submarines. = As soon as submarines receive definite information regarding position and course of enemy battle line, as a general rule, it {they] should turn at once to a collision course, modifying it as necessary for later reports of enemy. = [f] MISSION OF TYPES IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER TYPES IN BATTLE. = The War Instructions, 1923, p. 7, state that the Mission of the Battle Fleet is : "To defeat decisively,or to contain, the enemy main fleet." = It also states that: = 'The tactical missions of the various task forces and groups-p.47-of the fleet under various conditons of cruising, scouting and combat are stated in the instructions or are indicated by the orders under which united of the fleet may be operating. " = Besides indicating the missions of various task groups when crusing or scouting, the same publication makes the following definitions of mssions of types in BATTLE: = p. 85, "2500. When a major action is probable,units of the scouting fleet, unless already engaged with the enemy or engaged in other operations furthering the general plan, such as screening, tactical scouting. supporting the action of the support groups,or concentrating for an unsupported attack,will retire or move toward the van of the engagement."= p. 86,"2509. Battleship divisions - The battleship divisions of the scouting fleet will endeavor to take station in advance of the van of our battle line and operate as a detached wing for the purposes of engaging the enemy's fast wing, if assisting our light forces in their attack on the enemy battle line, and of guarding the van of our battle line against attacks by enemy destroyers." = [Instructions for other types of scouting fleet are analagous to those for similar types of battle fleet. ] = p. 109, "3055. Under normal conditions, the mission in battle of the detached wing is: [a] To engage the enemy fast wing or detached force. = [b] To support our light forces in their attack on the enemy battle line, or enemy light forces. [c] To defend by gunfire, the battle line against attacks by enemy destroyers. = [d] To attack a designated objective." = p. 112: '3104. The battle mission of the armored cruisers operating with the fleet, unless otherwise directed is: To defend the battle line from attacks by enemy light forces, including aircraft." = - p. 48- "3108. The light cruisers in the van and rear, will as a rule act as part of the attack groups, comprising the light cruisers, the destroyer attack squadrons, and the light mine layers in those areas. = "3109: Their missions in action are: [a] To support the destroyers and light mine layers in their attack on the enemy battle line or fast wing. = [b] To defend our battle line and detached wing against attacks by enemy light forces. =[c] To furnish the commander-in-chief with information as to enemy forces encountered, torpedo attacks, enemy mining, and other changes in the situation of which the commander-in-chief may lack information. = [d]The enemy retiring, to maintain contact with the enemy main body and furnish the commander-in-chief and the destroyer attacking force with information of its movements and position" = p. 114, "3125: The mission in battle of the destroyer attack squadrons is- = [a] To attack decisively the enemy battle line or fast wing with torpedoes. = [b] To defend the battle line against attacks by enemy light forces [counter-attack], which mission normally is secondary to their mission of attack." = p. 117, "3154.When the destroyer attack squadrons have launched their torpedoes,their mission as attack squdrons ceases, and their mission becomes - = [a] To assist other attack forces. = [b] To counter the attack of the enemy light forces." = p. 120, "3200. The mission in battle of the light mine layers attached to or operating with the battle fleet is -= [a] To lay mines tactically as directed; or = [b] To mine particular areas as directed." = p. 122, "3300. The mission of the aircraft squadrons in the fleet battle is -= -p. 49- = To assist to the maximum our battle line in defeating the enemy. = 3301. The duties of the aircraft squadrons of the fleet, contact having been made with the enemy, are in general as follows: = [a] The fighting squadrons. = 1. Defend our battle line and aircraft carriers against enemy aircraft attack.= 2. Attack enemy observation planes. = 3. Protect our observation planes [spotters]. = 4. Protect our bombing [torpedo] planes against enemy aircraft attack. = [b] The observation squadrons. = .1. Scouting = a. Scout strategically and tactically. = b. Scout in the vicinity of the engagement. = c. Scout for the enemy after the engagement. = 2. Spot fall of shot for our battle line-, = 3. Lay smoke screens as directed.= [c] The bombing [torpedo] squadrons. = 1. Attack enemy battle line, fast wing, and aircraft carriers with bomb and torpedo. = 2. Lay smoke screens as directed. = 3. Attack enemy destroyers or other light forces as directed. = 4. Attack enemy disabled ships after the engagement. = 3302 To accomplish successfully their mission, the aircraft squadrons must control the air in the battle area. = 3303. The personnel of the aircraft squadrons must be thoroughly indoctrinated and understand the general plan of the commander-in-chief and the operations of all types of vessels." = p. 125, " The mission in battle of submarines, when operating with the fleet as attack group is - = To attack and destroy enemy major ships." -p. 50-= The mission of the anti-submarine screen will of course be the same as when cruising, i.e. = p. 52, "1800. One mission of the anti-submarine screen is -,= To defend the vessels screened against submarine attack."= The preceding indicates the mission of TASK GROUPS. The mission of types will then be determined by their assignment to TASK GROUPS. = It may be well here to refer back to our basic TACTICAL PRINCIPLE "The guiding principle is that of concentration of maximum superiority on the decisive point. This decisive point will normally be the enemy battle line." = To quote "THE NAVAL BATTLE" [Naval War College 1240-6-23], p. 35 "That the objective of the fleet as a whole is the enemy fleet is, of course, self-evident, but the immediate objective of any part of one fleet is not just any part of one fleet that happens to come near. On the contrary, it is only such part of that fleet as lies in the way of reaching the main objective. To get an understanding of the immediate objective of his force at any given instant in battle, a commander has but to look upon the battle as a whole. Remembering that the foundation on which the work of any fleet is built is its heavy battle line, and that when the enemy's battle line is broken or destroyed, his whole fighting structure will crumble, it is evident that the main or primary objective of all parts of a fleet in battle is the opposing battle line. Every part of the fleet that can hit that line a blow must do so at the earliest possible moment and must keep hitting it with its full strength, as long as the line exists and blows can be struck against it.--- Subdivisions of a fleet must fight their way through any opposition tending to hold them from the main objective, but they must never do so at the expense of that objective." = In the same publication, p. 617:- = "Naval weapons are carried on ships of various types, the types being more or less standard in all navies, -as a general rule such type has been developed to utilize one of the weapons as its primary -p. 51- weapons, and though it may carry other weapons, they are of secondary importance, the ships of a type being operated in battle in a way to make their primary weapon most effective." = p. 9 "We have as the dominating phase in battle the gun fight between heavy ships, which fight establishes the main line of battle.Then we have attacks on the battle line by vessels carrying torpedoes or mines, the idea of which is to make the enemy heavy ships either accept the torpedo or mine menace or else pay a decisive price in gunfire in maneuvering to avoid it. Against such attacks we have the counter made by fast light cruisers, which by their speed and superior gun power can prevent the surface torpedo craft. or mine layers from obtaining the position to deliver their attack. Again, we have the attacks of submarines, which are directed against the heavy ships, and which are countered by anti-submarine craft carrying depth bombs. Finally we have air attacks, whch can be COUNTERED only by air attacks but which can be prevented if the aircraft carriers are attacked in such a way that they cannot launch their planes." = "In sea battles heavy ships naturally take a formation approximating to column and endeavor to hold the enemy about abeam and under the fire of all heavy guns. One most advantageous postion one battle line can gain over another is the "capping" or T" position, by which that line is in a position to fire its full broadside against the enemy while the enemy can reply with only the end-on fire of his nearest ships. One position equally favorable to each of two engaged battle lines is when they are abeam of each other. The "T" postion being so overwhelming advantageous, each battle line endeavors to obtain it for itself, or to approximate it as nearly as possible, while preventing the enemy from doing anything of the kind, and for this reason we have as the first principle of battleship tactics that of keeping one's own line always normal to the bearing of the center of the enemy's line." = "However in these days it is hardly possible for one battle line -p. 52-


#1179 p 66


#1179 -p. 52- to have sufficient excess speed to secure a "T" or to force the enemy to maneuver on into a knuckle, and since some such condition must be imposed to bring about a decisive advantage, other types of craft are brought in to produce it. The types that can be used for such purposes are [1] heavy gunned and fast battle cruisers, and [2] vessels carrying torpedoes or floating mines." ---destroyers or mine layers sent ahead of an enemy ship line to fire mine field have excellent opportunities to compel an engaged battle line to maneuver under fire or accept the menace of their weapons. This fact gives us the key to the employment of such craft in battles." ---"Thus the positions of the types of ships carrying the major weapons of attack are determined for us, and in the opening stages of modern battles they will probably be found about as follows: = [a] opposing BATTLESHIPS in parallel columns and about abeam of each other; [b] all or a major part of the battle cruisers ahead of or on the bow of the battleship line, the remainder in rear, or units engaged quarter; [c] the light attacking craft [destroyers and fast mine layers] ahead of the leading and astern of the rear battle cruisers. From these positions each type will endeavor to hit the enemy heavy ships with the full power of its weapons, overcoming outside resistance as may be necessary to accomplish the desired end. ---= "The counter to heavy ship attacks is generally made by heavy ships, but the counter to the attacks of destroyers and light mine layers is made by ships of the cruiser type- of battle cruisers from their positions as fast wings and by light cruisers, which have the speed of destroyers but very much heavier batteries. Hence on the extreme flanks of an engaged battle fleet, even beyond the destroyers, we place light cruisers whose mission it is to cover their own light craft in their attacks at the same time that they protect their own heavy ships against the attacks of enemy light craft.' = "In addition to the offensive types so far discussed as operating -p. 53- entirely on the surface and against surface craft, and which, as we have seen, work in close coordination with each other, we find in battle two other OFFENSIVE types previously mentioned, SUBMARINES and AIRCRAFT, which though powerful in attack cannot carry out their role in battle with anything like the precision and coordination possible betwen the surface types. ---Like the torpedoes of surface craft, those of submarines, to be effective, must be launched from favorable positions, but, owing to the limitations imposed on submarines by their low submerged speed and their inability to observe, gaining that postion is most difficult. Their great strength lies in the element of surprise contained in their attack, but their success is largely dependent on their original disposition as the battle opens and on the movements of the enemy thereafter.Hence only the broadest principles can be laid down for their use in battle. All that can be done is to start out as many as possible of them in such favorable positions that they will be in or near the area which enemy heavy ships must occupy to be within gun range, and then afterward to so maneuver our own battle line as to keep or draw the enemy batle line into that area so the submarines can attack. This they must do at every opportunity with a view to destroying the enemy heavy ships or throwing them into such confusion that gunfire can destroy them." ---= To get full results the aircraft effort must be very largely coordinated with the efforts of other types. Only by direct attack on enemy ships can aircraft by themselves accomplish much, and though such attacks may prove deadly, they usually cannot be made in sufficient strength to gain as much for their fleet as can other efforts in which the influence of aircraft is indirect, as for instance, information work, spotting gunfire, laying smoke screens, etc." = From the foregoing, the following conclusions are summarized: = 1. The "critical point" is normally the battle line of capital ships. = -p. 54- 2. All types concentrate efforts against enemy bttle line. = 3. Battleships normally use gun as primary weapon and enemy battle line as principal target. = 4. Destroyers and submarines normally use torpedo as primary weapon and enemy battle line as principal target. = 5. Fast mine layers normally use mine as primary weapon and enemy battle line as principal target [objective]. = 6.Light cruisers normally use gun as primary weapon and enemy light forces as principal target, particularly to clear away for attack by own light forces. If fitted with sufficient torpedo tubes light cruisers supporting destroyer attacks will seize opportunities to fire torpedoes against enemy battle line. = 7.Aircraft may operate directly against enemy battle line with bombs and torpedoes, but can usually accomplish mission best by clearing enemy aricraft from battle area, spotting, laying smoke screens, and furnishing information.= 8. Gunfire, torpedoes, and mines from all types should strike enemy battle line as nearly simultaneously as possible. = Bellairs - "Battle of Jutland" says: = "The main function of all the satellites of a fleet, whether they are mobile like aircraft, torpedo craft,. cruisers, or battle cruisers, or associated with immobile weapons like mines and bombs, is to enable the battle fleet to do its work while hampering and injuring the enemy battle fleet to the best of their ability." -p. 55- IV. [a] ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND. = [EMPLOYMENT OF TYPES AND COMMUNICATIONS]. It is not clear just what the commanders of the British and German fleets conceived to be their MISSIONS in the operations resulting in the battle of Jutland. = From Admiral Scheer's account it seems not improbable that his concepton of his MISSION was :- To seek and engage BRITISH detached force, avoiding or minimizing engagement with British main body. = From Admiral Jellicoe's account, it seems reasonable to believe that he considered his MISSION to be: - To retain command of the sea, engaging enemy forces encountered, insofar as probable gain justifies probable cost. = Jellicoe says in "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916" p. 392: "Many surmises have been made as to the object with which the High Sea Fleet put out to sea on this occasion. The view which I have always held is that the frequent light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the Skaggerak during the Spring of 1916, may have induced the Germans to send out a force with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet. If confirmation of this were needed, it is supplied in the German account of the battle, in which it is stated that 'there was no reason for supposing that any enemy forces were about, much less the entire British Fleet.'" = On p. 318: " The Grand Fleet put out to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea." = Scheer in "Germany's High Sea Fleet". p. 136, after discussion of previous plan for bombardment of Sunderland "intended to compell the enemy to send out forces against us", says: = "On May 30, as the possibility of a long distance aerial reconaissance was still considered uncertain, I decided on an advance in the direction of the Skaggerak, as the vicinity of the Jutland coast -p. 56- offered a certain cover against surprise. An extensive aerial reconnaisance was an imperative necessity for an advance on Sunderland in the Northwest, as it would lead into waters where we could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving battle. As, however,on the course now to be adopted, the distance from the enemy points of support was considerably greater, aerlal reconnaisance was desirable, though not absolutely necessary." = Corbett's "Naval Operations", Vol. III, p. 320, says: "But, pending the change Admiral Jellicoe did not wait with his arms folded. Satisfied that much might be done with the fleet as it was, he continued his efforts to entice the enemy to sea. Hitherto all his devices had failed to bring them far enough north, but by the end of the month he had prepared a plan that went beyond anything he had yet hazarded. Two squadrons of light cruisers were to proceed to the Skan, which they were to reach by dawn on June 2. Thence they would sweep right down the Kattegat as far as the Great Belt and the Sound, while a battle squadron would push into the Skaggerak in support. Such a bait, it was hoped, could scarcely fail to draw a strong enemy force from the Bight. Possibly, as had happened before, they would not come far enough north to ensure an action, but at least they might be lured into a trap. ---= "The plan, however, was destined never to be put to a test. By pure coincidence Admiral Scheer had already elaborated a strikingly similar combination with a practically identical object, and while the British operation was being worked out, he was only waiting for favorable weather to carry out his own, all unaware that it was precisely what his adversary was bent on forcing him to do. = "---May 30 was the last possible day to which Admiral Scheer's operations could be postponed, and late on the 28th he made a general signal for all units to be ready to sail next morning. Still the weather remained unchanged, and finally he had to confess that his favorite scheme was impracticable. On May 30, therefore, he directed Admiral Hipper to proceed with the scouting divisions -p. 57- to the Skaggerak, with orders to show himself off the Norwegian coast so as to ensure his presence being reported to the British Admiralty, while he himself would follow secretly with the battle fleet." = =-57-...= "In Admiral Hipper's order to show himself, there is a pleasant old-world flavor of the days before directional wireless. The precaution was needless. During the morning of the 30th there were indications that the High Seas Fleet was assembling in the Jade Roads outside Wilhelmshaven, and this, connected with the mystery of the submarines, pointed to some movement of unusual importance. Accordingly at midday on the 30th it was decided to warn Admiral Jellicoe that the German Fleet might go to sea early next morning and that there were as many as sixteen submarines out, most of which were believed to be in the North Sea. No definite orders were given. Beyond further indications that a large operation was at hand, all was still obscure. = ---It seemed possible that an operation which we thought had been planned some time before was about to commence, but further than this Admiral Scheer's intentions could not be fathomed.Shortly after 5:00 p.m., however, it became known that all sections of the High Seas Fleet had received a seemingly important operations signal. This could not be deciphered, but there was no time to lose, and at 5:40 a telegram was sent to the Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Beatty conveying to them the latest information and ordering them to concentrate as usual east of the "Long Forties", which stretched about a hundred miles east of the Aberdeen coast - and be ready for eventualities....= "To the northward all was equally ready, and by 10:30 p.m. all sections of the Grand Fleet were at sea making for the rendez-vous which Admiral Jellicoe had chosen- east of the Long Forties for himself, with the main portion of the fleet, he fixed a position off the Skaggerack [57 degrees-forty-five minutes North 4 degrees -fifteen minutes East] on a line between Buchan Ness and the south of Norway some ninety miles to the westward -p. 58- of the Naze, and there at 2:00 p.m. the next day Admiral Jerram would meet him from Cromarty with the Second Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, and nine destroyers of the Eleventh Flotilla with its flotilla leader. At the same time Admiral Beatty with the battle cruiser fleet and the "Queen Elizabeths" of the Fifth Battle Squadron [less the name ship, which was in dock] was to be at a rendezvous sixty-nine miles to the southsoutheast of the Commander-in-Chief - that is - in the direction of the Bight. For a true advanced squadron whose function was to bring the enemy within reach of the main fleet, the interval was undoubtedly too great, since in the North Sea visual connection could not be counted on over such a distance.But, as we have seen, this was not at the time the primary function of Admiral Beatty's force. As the prospect of a fleet action grew ever more remote, its tactical character as an advanced squadron became secondary to the ever present need of intercepting radio on our coast. To this end a disposition was needed which, while the battle fleet could be kept far enough back to prevent the enemy evading it to crush the Tenth? Cruiser Squadron and raise the blockade at the same time allowed the advanced force to be far enough to the southward to deal with a direct attack across the breadth of the North Sea A distance of fifty miles between the two parts of the Grand Fleet was the least that could satisfy these two conditions, and the disposition which Admiral Jellicoe now adopted had, after long consideration, become the approved normal whenever there were indications that the Germans were contemplating some large operation with an unknown objective.It was only when we ourselves were operating offensively that the interval was reduced to a mean of about forty miles." = p. 327. "Admiral Beatty... at noon made his position about forty miles short of the rendezvous, but this was an error, and in fact he was over five miles further away to the northwestward.= ...."He was a little late, but at 2:00, when he believed he was only ten miles short of his assigned position, though in fact the distance must have been over fifteen miles,- having no news of the enemy - p.59- he made a general signal, in pursuance of Admiral Jellicoe's instructions, for the fleet to turn northward at 2:15. The only information he had was the Admiralty telegram stating that, although it was thought the High Seas fleet had put to sea in the early morning, by directional wireless the German flagship seemed to be still in the Jade at 11:10." [Due to transfer of call signal prior to sailing.] = "The truth was that Admiral Hipper, with the German scouting force, consisting of five battle cruisers, five light cruisers, and thirty-three destroyers, had left the Jade at 2:00 a.m. and was as high up the Danish coast as the Jutland bank, approximately in the same latitude as Admiral Beatty's rendezvous and about fifty miles to the eastward of the LION. ... Following him, over fifty miles astern, was Admiral Scheer....= "But the incalculable did happen.... So now it happened that about the time Admiral Beatty made the signal for turning northward, the ELBING, Admiral Hipper's left wing light cruiser, sighted a steamer to the westward and detached one of her attendant destroyers to ascertain the stranger's character. At the same time Commodore Alexander-Sinclair, who, with his broad pendant in the GALATEA and with the PHAETON in company, was on the eastern wing of our cruiser screen, and was just about to turn north with the Admiral, also saw the vessel about fourteen miles eastsoutheast, and decided to hold on to the eastward a little to examine her. So luck would have it that the German destroyer as she came west sighted the GALATEA's smoke and reported it. ... The result was premature contact. He [Admiral Beatty] had only just settled down on his course to join the main battle fleet when, at 2:20, the GALATEA hoisted the welcome signal "Enemy in sight" and reported it could see "two cruisers, probably hostile, bearing southsoutheast, course unknown." = "For Admiral Beatty this was enough. Hitherto the GALATEA's reports had not been definite enough to warrant his departing from instructions to close the Commander-in-Chief. ... Meanwhile -p.60-the GALATEA, increasing speed, was coming within range of the enemy, and at 2:28 she opened fire, whereupon Admiral Beatty, seeing his cruiser screen engaged, made a general signal [2:32] to alter course in succession to southsoutheast and to raise steam for full speed to intercept the enemy's retreat. ... Four minutes earlier Admiral Hipper knew that the ELBING had got contact, and still without knowledge of the import of her news he had turned towards her. 'It was thanks to that steamer', writes Admiral Scheer, 'that the action took place. Had the destroyer not proceeded to the steamer and thus sighted the smoke of the enemy to the west, our course might have carried us past the English cruisers.' ...= "Sixty-five miles away to the northward Admiral Jellicoe had taken in the GALATEA's signals, and though there was nothing to lead him to expect anyhing more than an affair of cruisers, he ordered steam to be ready for full speed." = From the preceding accounts, we obtain a fairly accurate outline of the preliminary dispositions, intentions, and movements of opposed forces prior to contact. = From this point the battle of Jutland may be considered to begin. = Without attempting to follow the multitudinous details of the action, examination of important maneuvers and actions will be attempted with a view to studying use of types and efficiency of communications. = Admiral Jellicoe's account says: = "At 2:35 p.m. the GALATEA reported a large amount of smoke "as from a fleet" bearing eastnortheast followed by a report that the vessels were steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the eastward and northeast towards the smoke, - the enemy being sighted at 3:31 p.m. and identified as five battle cruisers accompanied by destroyers. ... Our light cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a similar class at long range." = -p.61- Beatty sent up a sea-plane to scout north northeast, which identified and reported four enemy light cruisers, the report being received on board the LION at 3:30 p.m. To quote Jellicoe again: "By this time the line of battle was being formed, the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the destroyers of the Ninth and Thirteenth Flotillas taking station ahead. The course was eastsoutheast, slightly converging on the enemy, the speed twenty-five knots, and the range 23,000 yards.. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke. = The Fifth Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet,, was now bearing northnorthwest, distant ten thousand yards; the weather was favorable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind southeast, and the visibility good....= "About 3:40 p.m., I received a report from Sir David Beatty that sighted five battle cruisers and a number of destroyers, and he also gave his position. = "As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as possible. By 4 p.m. the "Fleet Speed" was twenty knots....= "At 3:48 p.m. the action between the battle cruisers began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the commencement the fire from the German vessels was rapid and accurate, the LION being hit twice three minutes after fire was opened, and the LION, TIGER and PRINCESS ROYAL all receiving several hits by 4 p.m., observers on board our own ships were of opinion that our fire was also effective at that stage." = The British Battle Cruisers had steadied on course eastsoutheast, the German Battle Cruisers on southsoutheast. = To quote from the Naval War College monograph "The Battle of Jutland", Section III [Narrative of the Battle of Jutland]: = "Admiral Beatty had so formed his ships for action in a line -p/62-- p.62- of bearing that in the northeasterly wind the smoke of one ship should not interfere with the fire of the next. His course, eastsoutheast, converged on that of the enemy." = Torpedoes from German submarines were fired at this time but were evaded.= "At 3:48 the range had been closed to 18,500 yards, when both sides opened fire simultaneously." [NOTE: Frost's "Analysis of Jutland" states, p. 25: = "In general, during the early part of the action, when the visibility was good, fair initial ranges were obtained. There were, however, a number of instances even under these conditions of very poor range taking. Thus the LION made the opening range 18,500, while that taken by the PRINCESS ROYAL was 16,000. The LION's range was much too great, as no shorts were obtained until the fourth salvo.The TIGER also opened with 18,500 yards on the sights, but this was far too great, as in four minutes it was brought down to 4,600 yards, only about two thousand yards of which can be accounted for by the prevailing rate of change. The NEW ZEALAND opened with 18,100, and in one minute brought this down 2,300 yards, and in three minutes no less than 5,600 yards.On the German side Von Hase admits that his range takers were rattled and were out probably eight hundred yards; the TIGER states that the first salvo fired at her fell about two thousand yards short." = Corbett's "Naval Operations" Vol. III p. 333 says:"Admiral Hipper's idea of reducing the odds against him was to reserve his fire until the last moment, so as to close as near as possible before the action began. But now, as soon as he saw what Admiral Beatty was doing, he opened fire.= Simultaneously Admiral Beatty did the same, believing he was still over eighteen thousand yards away.In truth the range can hardly have been so great. Many of the first German salvoes were far over, but looking westward the visibility was very good, and the mistake was quickly corrected. ...So far as can be calculated from various -p. 63- data, it would seem that the distance at which our ships opened may have been as low as sixteen thousand yards, but whatever it was, this much is certain, that it was an intense relief to the Germans that we did not open fire from a longer distance, when the superiority which they believed our heavier guns gave us would have denied them the possibility of making effective reply." [Footnote states: 'Commander Von Hase, gunnery officer of the DERFFLINGER, says that his first few salvoes were over, though he began at 3:48 with fifteen thousand meters - 16,4O0 yards-. With the sixth salvo at 3:52 he straddled, their range being then 11,900 meters - thirteen thousand yards.']" = It is also noted that Naval War College publication "The Battle of Jutland" Sec. III, p. 61 states that, when Admiral Beatty formed for action in line of bearing to minimize smoke interference, the wind was Northeast. Admiral Scheer's report and Naval War College publication "Major Tactics at Jutland", p. 8 says"The wind was then northwesterly", and Admiral Jellicoe's account says "the weather was favorable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind southeast, and the visibility good. Commander Hase also mentions "the northwest wind." = From this point the range closed to about fourteen thousand or under on nearly parallel southeasterly courses, the six British battle cruisers, being directly engaged by five German battle cruisers, the British Fifth Battle Squadron of four QUEEN ELIZABETH type fast battle ships following in support of the British battle cruisers coming into action about 4:08. = Admiral Beatty apparently chose a southeast deployment course rather than northwest so as to deny enemy opportunity to evade action. Since he had a superior number of battle cruisers beside a squadron of four fast battleships and had no news of superior enemy forces near, this choice was undoubtedly correct for the information he had at the time. = Admiral Hipper, in accordance with instructions and Admiral Scheer's plan - as well as because of danger of being cut offf by superior forces, naturally chose a southeast deployment course in direction of his main body. p. 64- =Admiral Beatty may also have considered sunglare a disadvantage imposed upon the enemy although it is no longer considered advisable to assume this without consideration of possible silhouette effect as visibility decreases. = A very serious blunder in the British distribution of fire seems to have contributed largely to giving the Germans the very important advantage of priority in achieving initial success by landing heavy salvoes before some of their vessels were even under fire at all.This blunder occured because despite practically simultaneous opening of fire by opposing lines, the British range finder readings were considerably in error and also considerably different for adjacent ships and even more because of misinterpretation of fire distribution signals. = Corbett's "Naval Operations" Vol. III, p. 334 says: "His other advantage Admiral Beatty was bent on using to pay back what he had himself suffered at the Dogger Bank. Having one ship more than his opponent, he was able, while preserving the rule of keeping all the enemy under fire, to order the PRINCESS ROYAL, his next astern, to concentrate with him on the LUTZOW, in which Admiral Hipper was leading. But the QUEEN MARY, which was third in line, having apparently missed the signal for distribution of fire, took her opposite number, the SEYDLITZ, so that until she realized what was happening, the DERFFLINGER, which was second in the enemy's line, was left undisturbed for nearly ten minutes. In the rear half of our line a similar error occured. The TIGER, the QUEEN MARY's next astern, appeared also to have missed the signal, so that she and the NEW ZEALAND, who had correctly taken on the fourth ship, were both on the MOLTKE, while the INDEFATIGABLE and VON DER TANN enjoyed an undisturbed duel." = A footnote says:"The signal for the distribution of fire is not recorded in the signal logs of either the TIGER or the NEW ZEALAND. It was made by flags from the LION at 3:46. At 3:47 there was another flag signal to turn together eastsoutheast, and in half a minute came the signal, also made by flags, to open fire. = -p.65- Commander Von Hase in the DERFFLINGER, in his account. says of the German distribution of fire: = "Immediately after the change in course at 5:35 p.m. [3;35 British time] the signal was hoisted 'Fire Distribution from the left.' That meant that each German ship should take an English ship under its fire, counting off from the left wing."= Jellicoe says of the Battle Cruiser Action: "At about 4 p.m. it was evident by the accuracy of the enemy's fire that he had obtained the range of our ships, which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. The German ships frequently zigzagged for the purpose of confusing our fire control. = At this period the fire of the enemy's ships was very rapid and accurate; the LION received several hits, the roof of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 p.m. = At about 4:06 p.m. the INDEFATIGABLE was hit. ...She was again hit by another salvo forward, turned over and sank. =About this time [4:08 p.m.] the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, opening fire at a range between nineteen and twenty thousand yards. This slower squadron was some distance astern of the battle cruisers and by reason partly of the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and partly of the light to eastward having become less favorable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. At 4:12 p.m. the range of the enemy's battle cruisers from our own was about twenty-three thousand yards, and the course was altered from southsoutheast to southeast to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the increase in range. = The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more than one ship. = In accordance with the general instructions given by Sir David Beatty to destroyers when a favorable opportunity occurred, -p. 66 is missing from materials sent in photocopy from Naval War College l998 0 a copy might be on file there - p. 67- turning point ... [a footnote says "The casualties in the Fifth Battle Squadron were chiefly suffered in this period.. BARHAM [BERHAM?] had twenty-six killed and thirty-seven wounded, MALAYA lost sixty-three killed and thirty-three wounded. For over half an hour she bore the brunt of the fighting."] = As the German fleet advanced, isolated attempts to attack it with torpedoes were made by retiring British destroyers. These were evaded so far as can be learned, although one possible hit was claimed. = Scheer says of this period "at 6:45 p.m. [4;45 British] Squadrons II and III opened fire, while the Chief of Reconnaissance {Hipper] with the forces alloted to him, placed himself at the head of the Main Fleet. ... The English battle cruisers turned to a northwesterly course, QUEEN ELIZABETH [BARHAM?] and the ships with her followed in their wake, and thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers. In so doing, however, they came very much nearer to our Main Fleet, and we came on at a distance of 17 km [?m?] or less. While both the English units passed by each other and provided mutual cover, Captain Max Schultz, chief of torpedo ....? at Flotilla VI, attacked at 6:49 [4:49 p.m.] , with the Eleventh Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla. The result could not be seen." = [Note - not seen except possibly two which passed under a British destroyer.] "= The fighting which now ensued developed into a stern chase; our reconnaissance forces pressed on the heels of the enemy battle cruisers, and our Main Fleet gave chase to the QUEEN ELIZABETH [BARHAM?] and the ships with her." He mentions the fact that speed upward of twenty knots was attained during this period, but that in spite of this the British battle cruisers drew away, and continues: "Owing to the superior speed of Beatty's cruisers, our own, when the order came to give chase, were already outdistanced by the enemy battle cruisers and light craft, and were thus forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and adopt the enemy's course. Both lines of cruisers swung by degrees in concentric circles by the north to a northwesterly direction. -p. 68- A message which was to have been sent by the Chief of Reconnaissance [Hipper] could not be dispatched owing to damage done to the principal and reserve wireless stations on his flagship. The cessation of firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to the increasing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the horizon, until finally it became impossible, when, therefore, enemy light forces began a torpedo attack on our battle cruisers at 7:40 [5:40] p.m., the Chief of Reconnaissance had no alternative but to maneuver and finally bring the unit round to southwest, in an endeavor to close up with Main Fleet, as it was impossible to return the enemy's fire to any purpose.'= Commander Hase says of this period: = "Our battle cruiser squadron, however, could not maintain more than twenty-five knots for any length of time, and the English were fleeing easily at twenty-eight knots We did not at the time entirely understand the object of the enemy's maneuver. We supposed that he was hastening to join his main body, which the maneuver of the English cruisers had led us to understand was somewhere near. As a matter of fact, Admiral Beatty, by fully turning our flank while we were running at a maximum speed, and finally encircling us, had executed a magnificent maneuver, and his ships had shown a marvelous tactical efficiency. He had succeeded in crossing the "T" in an absolutely perfect manner. By capping us, he had compelled us to turn out, and thus finally brought us within the circle of the English battleships and battle cruisers. In the latter phase of the battle, we could no longer as a rule distinguish individual enemy ships that happened to be in front of our guns; I can not therefore say with certainty at what time or if at all we later engaged Beatty's four battle cruisers. = "After the gradual disappearance of the four battle cruisers, we were still confronted by the four powerful ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron, the MALAYA, the VALIANT, the BARHAM, and the WARSPITE. -p. 69- = They could not have been making very much speed at this time, as they soon came within range of our third squadrons and were taken under fire by its leading ships, especially by the flagship KOENIG. The four English battleships thus at times came under fire of at least nine German ships, of which five were battle cruisers and perhaps four or five battleships. ..The second phase of the battle passed without any great incidents for us." = The outstanding features of the phases of the battle up to this point seem to be: = 1. Despite superior speeds, type for type, as compared with the German ships, the British capital ships were not tactically concentrated sufficiently to either begin or end this action together either as regards time or distance.At the beginning this might be justified by fear of enemy's escape, but when menaced by the entire High Seas Fleet, it is not apparent that there was any compelling reason for separation of battle cruisers from the Fifth Battle Squadron at least until out of effective range. = 2.


p 66#1180


mid p.69 -- 2.The unity of thought and very thorough coordination of the whole German fleet is evidenced again and again in this phase. Battle cruisers or destroyers, all alike, are truly auxiliaries of the main body, always fitting themselves into the plan. = 3. The failure of two of the British battle cruisers to receive and execute the signal ordering desired distribution of fire seems very probably the most deadly error made in this phase. A ship like the DERFFLINGER having ten minutes undisturbed "target practice" at an enemy ship which does not reply may well change the entire result of a fleet battle, since it is still true that the best defense is a rapid well-aimed fire against the enemy. Certainly such an opportunity goes far to equalize the apparent superiority in numbers when six battle cruisers oppose five. In view of other failures to obey Beatty's signals in the prior engagement at Dogger Bank this failure to obey a vitally important signal is difficult to understand at all, since he might at least be expected to insist on doing away with the probability of a recurrence of such errors. = -p. 70- 4. The excellent information service of Beatty's light cruisers gave him time to avoid the "pincers" of Scheer's trap and was generally very efficient. = 5. Maintenance of high speed in action by both forces was very good. Beatty's ability to maintain superior speed gave him a very great power to choose his course of action and evade being forced merely to conform to enemy movements. = = 6. Apparently gunnery was good on both sides, but German control of fire seems to have been superior. = 7. Destroyer attacks were not used to very best advantage by either force. British destroyers became scattered and made isolated attacks, often with single torpedoes. Leadership and coordination of attack was lacking. = The German destroyers worked together with a light cruiser leader, and their attack resulted in firing of twelve torpedoes at eight thousand yards.This attack was somewhat better as to coordination but had no important results. =8.The junction of the German battle cruisers with their main body was very smoothly and easily made.= As stated in "An Analysis of Jutland" - " The German battle cruisers were maneuvered with beautiful precision throughout the battle, even after they had received heavy damage, and all their signal and radio gear had been shot away. They made no less than twenty-six simultaneous changes of course during the battle." = As stated in Captain Laning's "Major Tactics at Jutland"; - "When the German battle cruisers made contact with the German battle fleet, they met a battle line ready to receive them,-a line not only so arranged that its fastest and heaviest ships could immediately enter the fight, but also so disposed that the battle cruisers and light forces with them could round into their engagement stations without any other maneuvering." = -also so disposed that the battle cruisers and light forces with them could round into their engagement stations without any other maneuvering." = -p.71- The junction of the British Grand Fleet with their battle cruisers was very different. "An Analysis of Jutland" says: "The concentration between the Battle Cruiser Fleet and Battle Fleet between 5:45 and 6:45 resulted in very grave confusion at a critical time."=-Jellicoe says: "The plot made on the reports received between five and six p.m. from Commodore Goodenough, of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, and the report given at 4:45 p.m. from Sir David Beatty in the LION giving the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet, might meet the High Sea Fleet aproximately ahead and that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight enemy nearly ahead of the center. Obviously, however, great reliance could not be placed on the positions given by the ships of Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. I realized this, but when contact actually took place, it was found that the positions given were at least twelve miles in error when compared with the IRON DUKE's reckoning.The result was that the enemy's Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead as I expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated----at 5:45 p.m. the COMUS ... three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i.e. three points from ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing southsouthwest although no ships could be seen. = "At about 5:50 p.m. I received a wireless signal from Sir Robert Arbuthnot of the First Cruiser Squadron, reporting having sighted ships in action bearing southsouthwest and steering northeast. There was, however, no clue as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind that they might be the opposing battle cruisers.---The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet and its formation caused me to continue in the Battle Fleet on the course southeast by south Se by S at a speed of twenty knots, in divisions line ahead disposed [???]-to starboard, the IRON DUKE at 6 p.m. being in Latitude 57.11 North Longitude5.39 East. ... At 5:56 p.m. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported -p-p.72- strange vessels in sight bearing southsouthwest and steering east, and at 6 p.m. he reported them as British battle cruisers three to four miles distant, the LION being the leading ship....= "Shortly after 6 p.m. we sighted strange vessels bearing southwest from the IRON DUKE at a distance of about five miles. They were identified as our battle cruisers, steering east across the bows of the Battle Fleet. ... = "At 6:01 p.m., immediately on sighting the LION, a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 6:10 p.m., and at 6:14 he signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet bearing southsouthwest'; this report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment." = It is thus apparent that the importance of coordinating all actions relative to the Main Body and the needs and intentions of the Commander-in-Chief was largely ignored by Beatty's force.Whether this resulted from their severe damage in action or was simply due to faulty indoctrination is not entirely clear, but there seems to be little doubt that since Beatty's light forces provided him with good early information, he was quite aware of a fleet commander' s need of it, and since he was able,. at 6:14 p.m., to report to Jellicoe, it must have been inattention to the needs of the Commander-in-Chief that prevented his forwarding to Jellicoe sufficient news. = Also it would seem that the navigational inaccuracies resulting in a twelve mile error at a most critical time could have been avoided by proper attention and insistence by fleet and force commanders upon the keeping of exact records, particularly by information groups, and by training all units of the fleet to properly comprehend their respective functions relative to the Commander-in-Chief. = From this point [6 p.m.] the approach of the opposing battle fleets to fighting ranges began. = -p.73- Scheer says, of this period:"While this encounter with the advance guard of the English Main Fleet was taking place, we, on our flagship, were occupied debating how much longer to continue the pursuit in view of the advanced time.There was no longer any question of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the Skaggerak, as the meeting with the English fighting forces, which was to result from such action had already taken place. = . But we were bound to take into consideration that the English Fleet, if at sea, which was obvious from the ships we had encountered, would offer battle the next day. Some steps would also have to be taken to shake off the English light forces before darkness fell in order to avoid any loss to our Main Fleet from nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks. = A fresh unit of cruisers [three "INVINCIBLES" and four "WARRIORS"] bore down from the north, besides light cruisers and destroyers. A further message from the torpedo boat flotillas...stated that they had sighted more than twenty enemy battleships following a southeasterly course. It was now quite obvious that we were confronted by a large portion of the English Fleet. ..This was the beginning of the main phase of the battle...The leaders of our battleship squadrons- the Fifth Division- turned at once for a running fight carried on at about thirteen thousand meters. The other divisions followed this movement on orders signalled from the flagship. ...The position of the English line [whose center we must have faced] to our leading point, brought fire on us from three sides." = Jellicoe says: -"As the evidence accumulated that the enemy's Battle Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the IRON DUKE, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on the port wing column.... I, therefore, decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, division....The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division show that the range of the van of the enemy's Battle Fleet at the moment of deployment was about thirteen thosand yards." = -p.74- The deployment of the British fleet has been the subject of much discussion. Without going into the details it may be stated that as said in Captain Laning's " Major Tactics at Jutland" "Under the pressure of being himself surprised by picking up the enemy battleships on an unexpected bearing, Admiral Jellicoe certainly deployed on the flank that was SAFEST, and, considering the situation he had permitted himself to get into, we can hardly find fault with his choice, though we can and should take note of the faulty approach dispositions that led up to it." In other words the British fleet was surprised because of lack of good information in time. = It still seems that, if the British fleet had felt itself capable of countermarching under fire if necessary [as the Germans subsequently succeeded in doing three times during the battle] Jellicoe could have deployed toward his Battle Cruiser Force in a southwesterly direction--engaged the German Fleet on reverse course, if they continued to advance northward, or pounding the northern end of their column if they countermarched. If the Germans continued their advance northward, Jellicoe could then have opened the range by easing off to westward,- then countermarched- and resumed the engagement. The much discussed silhouette effect might have imposed a handicap upon him, but closing the range with his superior force should have countered this handicap. = As it proved, the British fleet deployed with much disorder. = The British First Light Cruiser Squadron got to northward of the Battle Fleet, after fouling First Cruiser Squadron and passing through battleship formation. Several rear collisions occurred, and many changes of course and speed occurred because of interference by vessels of own fleet. = The British Fleet finally got deployed, Battle Cruisers in the van,the Third Battle Cruiiser Squadron taking station ahead of Beatty's force. -p. 75- During the deployment of the British Fleet this Third Battle Cruiser Squadron was ordered by Admiral Beatty to take station ahead, and the Fifth Battle Squadron took position in rear of the Battle Fleet. This in effect was trading back the borrowed Fifth Battle Squadron for the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, normally part of his force but detached since the engagement. = This Third Battle Cruiser Squadron almost immediately became hotly engaged with the German van. =The British Battle Cruiser INVINCIBLE was sunk; the German Battle Cruiser LUTZOW was seriously damaged and probably torpedoed during this period.= Minor forces were meanwhile engaged, and casualties suffered on both sides, the DEFENCE sunk, and the WIESBADEN crippled. = Scheer now launched a concentrated torpedo attack against the head of the British Fleet and reversed the course of his fleet by simultaneous ship movement. Part of Torpedo Boat Flotilla III failed to comprehend the situation and retired too early, but other destroyers in position to do so attacked and used artificial smoke to cover the turn about. Many torpedoes crossed the British line,- one struck the MARLBOROUGH about 6:54 p.m. As a result the range was opened, and Scheer had gained room to get his fleet headed in a more southerly direction. [The inevitable direction in which he could have been expected to go as soon as possible after encountering superior forces. This again shows what Jellicoe could have done by opening engagement by deployment on starboard flank on course opposite to course of German fleet when first encountered..] = course of German fleet when first encountered..] = The British maneuvered to close the range. = Scheer decided to try to make British destroyers expend torpedoes before dark and also to try to rescue survivors from WIESBADEN. Therefore he again countermarched by simultaneous ship movements and stood eastward. The fighting was resumed. German vessels detailed were unable to penetrate to WIESBADEN for rescue purposes because of very heavy fire, so at 7:17 Scheer again countermarched and withdrew. p. 76=To cover this countermarch, Scheer at 7:12 ordered the Battle Cruisers and torpedo boats to cover the movements of the fleet. This was done but at the cost of terrible punishment to the already hard fought battle cruisers.The tropedo attack was well delivered, - about nineteen torpedoes crossed the line, - the British battle line was forced to maneuver, and Scheer's fleet escaped in the twilight, smoke screens being cleverly used to cover Main Body.= Between 7:10 and 7:40 the British fleet was maneuving to avoid torpedoes, a signal being made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points to port, and a subsequent turn of two points more being made shortly after.Individual ship movements to avoid torpedoes were also made.This ended the daylight engagement. = The German fleet continued westward, Squadron Two easing off to starboard as the Fleet soon afterward changed to a southerly course. -.= About 8:20 Beatty's battle cruisers, following in support of First and Third light cruiser squadrons, which Beatty had sent in to locate the German fleet,engaged German battle cruisers, light cruisers,and one or two battle squadrons, light forces on each side firing torpedoes.Touch was lost about 8:38; the German fleet apparently deliberately shaking off the British by moving to westward. Subsequently, the German fleet steamed south, gradually changed more to eastward, and according to Scheer's account:"At eleven p.m. the head of the line stood at 36.37 [56.37?] North Latitiude, and 5.30 East Longitude.At 11:06 p.m. the order for the night was 'course southsoutheast, one-quarter East, speed sixteen knots.'" = He further says: "All flotillas were ordered to be ready to attack at night, even though there was a danger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that was expected. The Main Fleet in close formation was to make for Horn Reef by the shortest course, and defying all enemy attacks, keep on that course.... The leaders of the torpedo boats were instructed to arrange night attacks for the flotillas." = -p.77- He mentions the loss of the FRAUENLOB,POMMERN, Y-4, ROSTOCK, and ELBING during the night, also the abandonment and sinking of the LUTZOW. Of these it appears that the FRAUENLOB, ROSTOCK, and POMMERN were torpedoed during the night, the ELBING damaged by collision, and the V-4 [Y-4?] sunk by a mine. = He reached Horn Reef about five A.M.and proceeded into port. = Jellicoe steered a southerly course, placing destroyers astern in order, as he says, to fulfill "three conditions; first they would be in an excellent position for attacking the enemy's fleet should it also turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the night [which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy]; secondly, they would also be in a position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum.Accordingly at nine p.m., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter course by divisions to south, informing the Flag Officer of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyers' flotillas of my movements in order that they should conform. ...= "As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course,the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of the Battle Fleet, - at 9:32 p.m. a signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader ABDIEL [---} to proceed to lay a mine-field in a defined area some fifteen miles from the VYL lightship, over which it was expected the High Seas Fleet would pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during the night via the HORN reef.The ABDIEL carried out this operation unobserved." = At about 12:30 a.m. the German van crossed the rear of the British fleet, the MOLTKE passing close to the British Sixth Division. Apparently the MOLTKE was the vessel referred to by Jellicoe "At 12:30 a.m. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to the -p. 78- PETARD and TURBULENT. She rammed the TURBULENT and opened a heavy fire on both the TURBULENT and PETARD; the TURBULENT sank, and the PETARD was damaged." ...= Jellicoe further says"At 2:47 a.m. as dawn was breaking the Fleet altered course to north and formed single line ahead." = The opposing fleets continued to separate, and the battle was practically ended.= Many minor contacts were made during the night. = German destroyers fired a few torpedoes at smaller ships during the night but did not penetrate to British capital ships. = The British destroyers made several attacks and got close enough to attack capital ships.They got at least two hits- one on the ROSTOCK about 11:30- 12:30, one on the POMMERN about two a.m. It seems probable that the FRAUENLOB was torpedoed by the SOUTHAMPTON about 10:20, firing toward FRAUNENLOB's searchlights. = In general the battle seems to have shown better tactical concentration by ther Germans at all times. The British forces had difficulty on many occasions because of faulty disposition, poor communications, and poor navigation. = A remarkable feature of the battle was the success of both fleets in continuing maneuvers at battle speeds for hours without serious breakdown [except for WARSPITES's steering gear.] = The employment of light cruisers and battle cruisers seems to have been very good on both sides. Beatty's lack of concentration of his force and failure to furnish ample or accurate information to the Commander-in-Chief seem to have been the only errors. The handling of the British light cruisers seems to have been easily the finest and most brilliant work in the British fleet, whether seeking information, supporting our destroyers, or countering attacks of enemy light forces.= The handling of battleships seems to have been done somewhat less well by the British. Considerable confusion during deployment occurred, and it is not apparent that this was entirely due to the lack of information and poor visibility. = -p. 79- It seems that Jellicoe's much discussed deployment on the left flank was the best under the conditions of poor visibility and lack of information existing at the time, even though subsequent study of the situation shows rare possibilities for deployment on the other flank. = The handling of destroyers in the Battle of Jutland was such as to indicate that British destroyers lacked training for their primary mission - the offensive against enemy capital ships- and probably were even acting under instructions prohibiting destroyer attacks without definite orders. = The German destroyers, on the other hand, appear to have been trained for offensive action to a great extent than the British, had excellent indoctrination and communication, and made efficient use of light cruisers as destroyer leaders. = When the British destroyers with Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers attempted a torpedo attack with twelve destroyers at 4:15 p.m., [they] encountered a German force of fifteen destroyers plus the light cruiser REGENSBURG. A gun fight broke up both attacks, so that it appears that the twelve British destroyers succeeded in firing only five of their forty-eight torpedoes, and Admiral Scheer says that the German destroyer fired twelve at somewhat over eight thousand yards range. The British destroyer PETARD also fired three torpedoes shortly afterwards. = It is doubtful if any damage resulted to either side from these torpedoes. = The British destroyers on this action appear to have lacked coordination. = During the second phase, while the battle fleets were engaged, the British destroyers appear to have been hampered by instructions restricting their offensive action to such as might be definitely ordered, also by confusion during deployment of battle fleet, and by poor visibility preventing their thorough appreciation of opportunities. = -p. 80- The German destroyers appear to have been very well handled during the battle fleet action. Three [G-88, S-32, and V-73] fired a total of six torpedoes from seven thousand yards on bow of First Battle Squadron, all of which crossed the line, one hitting the MARLBOROUGH, about 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. = The German destroyer attack between 7 :10 to 7:25 fired twenty-one torpedoes, of which nineteen crossed the line. Although the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was ordered by Admiral Jellicoe to move out and counter this attack, and although no torpedo damage from this attack is known to have resulted, there is no doubt that this attaack was very successful from the point of view of Admiral Scheer, since it forced the British line to either keep away or turn away and deprived it of favorable opportunity of getting effective gunfire on German battle line while in itself in a favorable "capping position of the "T". = The smoke screen tactics of the German destroyers at the time were excellent, as also somewhat earlier about 6:40 covering attack, which resulted in hitting the MARLBOROUGH. = Admiral Beatty says of the attack about 7:30: "At 7:32 my course was southwest, speed eighteen knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing northwest by west. The destroyers at the head of the enemy line emitted volumes of gray smoke, covering their capital ships aswith a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7:45 we lost sight of them." = It thus appears that the German destroyers were generally of more service, during daylight, that the British despite very determined action by individual British units. How far this was the result of instructions restricting initiative and how far it was due to lack of training for offensive action is not entirely clear. It is however, apparent that the German destroyers were better trained to determine and execute the will of their Commander-in-Chief, were better coordinated, were skillful in delivering attacks under varying conditions, and could make very effective -p.81- use of smoke screens. = During the night Admiral Jellicoe states: "As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course, the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of the Battle Fleet." = Admiral Scheer says: "It might safely be expected that in the twilight the enemy would endeavor by attacking with strong forces, and during the night with destroyers, to force us over to the west in order to open battle with us when it was light. He was strong enough to do it.If we could succeed in warding off the enemy's encircling movement, and ccould be the first to reach Horn Reef, then the liberty of decision for the next morning was assured to us. In order to make this possible all flotillas were ordered to be ready to attack at night, even though there was a danger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that was expected. --- The leaders of the torpedo boats were instructed to arrange night attacks for the flotillas." = The German destroyers at night failed to execute the will of the Commander-in-Chief well. How far this was due to lack of initiative of flotilla commanders and how far to lack of knowledge of the bearing of the enemy main body is not clear. The fact remains that at daylight most of them were still with the High Seas Fleet despite Scheer's decision to order them to attack "even though there was a danger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that was expected." They did not penetrate to the vicinity of the British main body. = The British destroyers were grouped five miles astern of the Battle Fleet during the night, were not ordered to attack, apparently were not ordered to do anything but keep out of the way, ward off enemy destroyers, and be in position between the German Fleet and its base. Nevertheless, they did torpedo the POMMERN and ROSTOCK, caused sufficient confusion in German fleet to cause two light cruisers to collide, and fired about thirty-five torpedoes. It may be that it was more good -p. 82- fortune than sound tactics that caused the British destroyers to get into favorable attack positions during the night, but at least they had initiative enough to make good use of their opportunities. = Little difficulty in effecting communication was had, but particularly in the British Fleet, an excessive time for transmission of messages was required. Jellicoe mentions several instances during the approach about 5:45 to 6:15 p.m.,- among others are these: "At 5:55 p.m. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,--inquiring what he could see. The reply was: 'Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the starboard bow'. This reply was received at about 6:05 p.m.... At 5:56 p;.m. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported strange vessels in sight--- and at 6 p.m. he reported them as British battle cruisers.--This report was made by search light and consequently reached me shortly after 6 p.m., but as showing the interval that elapses between the intention to make a signal and the actual receipt of it [even under conditons where the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid delay, and the signal staff is efficient], it is to be noted that whereas the report gave the bearing of our vessels as southsouthwest, - notes taken on board the COLOSSUS placed our battle cruisers one point on the starboard bow of that ship- that is, on a southsoutheast bearing and distant two miles at 6:05 p.m. = "At 6:01 p.m., immediately on sighting the LION,a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 6:10 p.m., and at 6:14 p.m. he signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet bearing southsouthwest'; this report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment." = As stated in Captain Hinds' lecture on "Scouting and Screening",: "Admiral Jellicoe lost the opportunity to destroy the German High Sea Fleet at the Battle of Jutland through delayed and conflicting reports, which amounted to a real lack of positive, accurate information. The damage done by this lack of information was intensified at two points - first, it delayed the deployment; second later on -p.83-


1924TACTICSjbb p 83-95 +Austral names w p66-1181


p. 83 in the action,the British Battle fleet lost touch with the Germans because Admiral Jellicoe did not know the German fleet had turned away. The first lack of information cost the British a loss of sixteen minutes; the second a loss of about twenty minutes, and, as Nelson said, 'Time is everything.' Five minutes makes the difference between a victory and a defeat." = During the battle after dark one British battle cruiser asked another for the recognition signals. Another ship saw this and thought the request was from a German ship.= It seems that the British Amdiralty furnished Jellicoe with more accurate information than he was able to obtain from vessels of his own fleet after dark, this despite numerous contacts and actions all night. = Scheer suffered to a slight extent from lack of information but never seriously. Apparently he waited for news of the LUTZOW at daybreak, but received news of her within half an hour. = However, it seems that whatever faults were encountered in communications were due to lack of proper training and not to failure of materiel [except after damage by gunfire]. = This indicates that enemy interference with radio is not likely to be serious, and that little difficulty will be experienced if personnel is properly trained and procedure properly systematized. = It further appears that the British Admiralty made very effective use of radio bearings to locate enemy positions and movements. = Summing up Jutland, - it appears that Hipper outfought Beatty's superior and faster [except Fifth Battle Squadron] force, that German main body effected junction with Hipper smoothly and easily, - whereas the junction of the British main body with Beatty was faltering and confused, and that Scheer then proceeded to out-maneuver Jellicoe, evaded the superior British forces between him and his base, and withdrew at will when menaced by superior forces. = -p.84- Baudry, a-propos of maneuvers in battles, said in "The Naval Battle": = "The Nile is genuine Nelson, very pure and very simple. It is victory of numerical superiority created by maneuver.It stands also as the typical French defeat, the defeat of inertia and "each to each."... "But let us remember this much of both Trafalgar and the Nile - that individually and collectively alike, the victors maneuvered against their opponents, to create a superiority of number in their own favor.This achieved,their weapons were set to work." = This the Germans seem to have succeeded in doing at Jutland. = -p.85- IV. [b] A BATTLE OF THE SAIL PERIOD AND ITS EFFECT ON THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF TACTICAL PRINCIPLES. = Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History" in pointing out the importance of study of the past military history as "essential to correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future", states:"For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons....= "It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history and experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing ships. ... But,while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ; for when the imagination is carried away by the detection of points of resemblance, - one of the most pleasing of mental pursuits,- it is apt to be impatient of any divergence in its new-found parallels and so may overlook or refuse to recognize such." = "... In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness,- to be fanciful. It may be so considered to point out that, as the sailing-ship had guns of long range,with comparatively great penetrating power,and cannonades, which were of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes, - the latter being effective only within a limited distance and then injuring by smashing,- while the gun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are distinctly tactical considerations, which must affect the plans of admirals and captains; and the analogy is real, not forced...." = "... The relative positions of two ships, or fleets, with reference to the direction of the wind involved most important tactical questions and was perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age.--- The distinguishing feature of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving or refusing battle at will -p.86- which in turn carries the usual advantages of an offensive attitude in the choice of the method of attack. This advantage was accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order, exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice of part or all of the artillery-fire of the assailant, - all which were incurred in approaching the enemy. The ships, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack; if it did not wish to retreat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiving battle on the enemy's terms.This disadvantage was compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle undisturbed,and by a sustained artillery fire to which the enemy for a time was unable to reply. Historically, these favorable and unfavorable characteristics have their counterpart in the offensive and defensive operations of all ages.The offence undertakes certain risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the defence,so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance, holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the exposure to which the assailant submits himself. These radical differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them,that the former was ordinarily chosen by the English, because their steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy; whereas the French sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive encounters and preserve their ships....The power to assume the offensive, or to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party which has the greater speed; which in a fleet will depend not only upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical uniformity of action. Henceforth the ships which have the greatest speed will have the weather gage. = It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of galleys.Both have their points of resemblance to the modern -p. 87- ships; both have also points of essential difference, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical PRECEDENTS to be followed. But a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. ...= "The battle of the Nile, in 1798,was not only an overwhelming victory for the English over the French fleet,- but also had the decisive effect of destroying the communications between France and Napoleon's army in Egypt.In the battle itself, the English Admiral, Nelson,gave a most brilliant example of grand tactics - if that be, as has been defined, 'The art of making good combinations' preliminary to battles as well as during their progress. The particular tactical combination depended upon a condition now passed away,- which was the inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which underlay the combination, - namely, to choose that part of the enemy's order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, - has not passed away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Cape St. Vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven,was dictated by the same principle, though in this case, the enemy was not at anchor, but under way. ..." = In Daveluy's "The Genius of Naval Warfare" we read: "It was at the Battle of the Texel, in 1665, that for the first time a fleet was seen fighting in order. In this battle the English fleet, commanded by the Duke of York,was drawn up in line ahead, close-hauled. This order was at once adopted by naval powers, and took the name, 'line of battle'. = It is known that it owed its origin to solicitude to give the ships a clear field of fire, to preserve them from being raked and to repel the attacks of fire ships.The line of battle was the initial formation for combat,--during the action it was sought to derive from it the greatest possible advantage.Thus there was created, in each Navy, a body of doctrines whose principles differed little because they had a common starting point. ... -p.88- = "..Nelson,breaking away from methods which had outlived the necessities that gave them birth, frees himself from the bonds that an outworn tactics puts upon his designs; and instead of using as best he can the instrument given him by tradition, - forges a new one, which will be the executer of his thought. ...The overwhelming results of the battle of Trafalgar marked a new era in the tactics of fleets under sail.Nelson, in fact, had put himself in formal opposition to the unalterable principles, without which there seemed not to be any safety. For the classic order of battle he substitutes order in columns; he does not hesitate to break his ranks in contempt of all the rules; finally,- he attacks the enemy's line at right angles instead of approaching it by edging up.Thus all the old scaffolding of tactics crumbled in a day, burying our Navy under its debris. = "Whence came then the impotence of the doctrine that had so long ruled the fleets of Europe? From the fact that it contained two germs of weakness: its starting point was false, and it was based on a fiction. = "Its starting point was false; for when one fights, one ought to think of attacking before seeking to defend oneself; and one ought only to defend oneself to an extent that permits the defensive to second the offensive. But the line of battle is a defensive formation; it derives its strength from the mutual assistance that the vessels afford to each other; the necessity of not leaving its position so as not to weaken the line prevents each ship from engaging freely. ... = "If we seek to analyze Nelson's mode of action,-which was likewise that of Suffren- we observe that it did not have a single point in common with the old ways." = [NOTE: Some of the foregoing statements are of questionable accuracy. His objective is well defined: to destroy the enemy. Every other consideration disappears before that one.To attain this end,the best method is to crush ships with superior forces, - to fight two against one. Nelson, therefore, will concentrate his forces upon a fraction of those of his adversary, and he will -p. 89- direct his blows upon the point most difficult to succor; he will attack the rear. But instead of waiting [awaiting], as till then had been done, an opportunity to effect a partial concentration during the action, he will know how to impose [the weight]of all his forces from the beginning. = Laughton's "Studies in Naval History" [1887] p. 117 says: "De Suffren's qualities as a tactician were of the first order,p. 89 line 7 - and in that age of nautical pedantry, he appears as one of the earliest who endeavored to apply sound principles to the conduct of battles at sea. As in armies, so in fleets,that one is effectively the most numerous that can bring the greatest number into action at a given point; and it is not a little curious that, on the very same day in different hemispheres,this- as a new system of naval tactics,was inaugurated by the admirals of two different nations; for it was on this same 12 April, 1782, that Sir George Rodney, in th West Indies,gained a decisive victory by means of a maneuver which,though widely different in detail,was essentially similar to that which M. de Suffren put in practice in the East; the concentrating - that is,- the attack upon a part of the enemy's fllet, instead of dispersing it along the whole..In the West Indies,the accident of a varying wind gave Rodney the opportunity of putting in practice the idea which he had attempted to develop on 17 April, 1780; and we have already seen how, in the EastIndies,on 17 February, 1782, fortune had pointed out to Suffren the way to attain tactical advantage.He was now, on April 12,ready to avail himself of the favorable circumstances.The French fleet had an actual numerical superiority; Suffren had learned how to make that superiority still greater. = The wind was from about northeast, and the English fleet was close hauled on the starboard tack; but the four rearmost ships - MAGNANIME, ISIS, HEOR, and WORCESTER, were somewhat astern and to leeward of their station. The French commander, therefore, directing his four leading ships to engage the van and hold it in check, threw -p.90-himself, with the rest of his force,on the English center. The onset was tremendous. Suffren himself in the HEROS, backed up by the ORIENT,another 74,engaged the SUPERB, the English flagship,at close range; afterwards, leaving the SUPERB to other ships as they came up,passed on to the MONMOUTH, the ship ahead,and turned her heavy metal against the little sixty-four.But the MONMOUTH, worthy of her ancient fame,and of the day when, twenty years before,her namesake had,singlehanded, captured the FOUDROYANT of eighty-four guns- heroically resisted the still greater odds now against her. She, however, suffered terribly, and being reduced almost to a wreck,and unmanageable,shot up into the wind, and was thus thrown into a very prominent position betwen the two lines.At this critical juncture Sir Edward endeavored to bring the SUPERB in between her and the French flagship; but the ORIENT and BRILLIANT interposing,obliged him to pass to leeward,leaving the MONMOUTH still exposed to the fire of the whole French line.Other ships came up; and the battle raged furiously round the little MONMOUTH.The HEROS lost her fore topmast, and received such other serious damage that SUFFREN went on board the AJAX, where he hoisted his flag.The ORIENT's mizzen-topmast was shot away, her mainmast badly wounded, and her topsail in flames. On the other hand,the MONMOUTH had nothing but the foremast standing; the SUPERB was on fire below;and in both these ships the loss of men was very great. The SUPERB had fifty-nine killed and one hundred two wounded.Such a loss in the two ships of the English center shows with what vigor the French attack had been pushed against that particular portion of the line.On the van, they had made no impression; and in the rear,whilst the English ships were to leeward, the French held their wind and took but little part iin the action. = "About four o'clock, Sir Edward Hughes made the signal to wear,- principally, it would seem, because the fleet was getting into shoal water; -partly, perhaps,with a wish to bring what remained of his line to windward of the MONMOUTH.The French line endeavored to -p.91-follow his example,but in the confusion which the evolution threw them into, Captain Hawker of the HERO took the MONMOUTH in tow,and placed her in comparative safety to leeward.The fight continued some time longer, though with slackened fury;and about half-past five, when a violent squall, with heavy rain,came down on the two fleets,the firing ceased as if by mutual consent... = Mahan in "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" p. 438 says of this battle: Hughes found that his slow sailers could not escape the fastest of his enemy,- a condition which will always compel a retreating force to hazard an action, unless it can resolve to give up the rear ships,and which makes it imperative for the safety, as well as the efficiency, of a squadron that vessels of the same class should have a certain minimum speed. The same cause - the danger of a separated ship - led the unwilling DeGrasse, the same day in another scene, to a risky maneuver and to a great mishap.Hughes, with better reason, resolved to fight; and at nine a.m. formed his line on the starboard tack, standing in-shore,the squadron in good order, with intervals of two cables between the ships.His account, which again varies from that of Suffren,giving a radically different idea of the tactics used by the French commodore, and more to the credit of the latter's skill, will first be followed. He says: = "The enemy, bearing North by east,distant six miles,with wind at North by east, continued maneuving their ships and changing their positions in line, till fifteen minutes past noon, when they bore away to engage us,- five sail of their van stretching along to engage the ships of our van, and the other seven sail steering directly on our three center ships, the SUPERBE, the MONMOUTH, her second ahead, and the MONARCA, her second astern,--at half past one the engagement began in the van of both squadrons; three minutes after I made the signal for battle the French admiral in the HEROS and his second astern in the in the L'ORIENT [both seventy-fours] bore down on -p.92-the SUPERBE within pistol shot. The HEROS continued in her position giving and receiving a severe fire for nine minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the MONMOUTH, at that time engaged with another of the enemy's ships, making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the attack of our center,where the engagement was hottest.At three the MONMOUTH had her mizzen-mast shot away, and in a few minutes her mainmast, and bore out of the line to leeward; and at forty minutes past three the wind unexpectedly continuing far northerly without any sea breeze, and being careful not to entangle our ships with the land, I made signal to wear and haul by the wind in a line of battle on the larboard tack, still engaging the enemy. " = Mahan comments: "Now here, practically, was concentration with a vengance..The casualties were very much heavier, in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the leaders of the two columns at Trafalgar. The material injury to hulls,spars etc. was yet more serious.The English squadron, by this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction of it, was entirely crippled. = Inferior when the action began,its inferiority was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two ships,and Suffren's freedom to move was increased. = But how far was this concentration intended by Suffren? For this we must go to the pages of two French writers, who base their narratives upon his own dispatches on record in the French Marine Office. The practical advantage gained by the French must also be tested by comparing the lists of casualties and the injuries received by their individual ships;for it is evident that if both the squadrons received the same total amount of injury, - but that with the English it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for action for a month or more, - while with the French the damage was divided among the twelve, allowing them to be ready again in a few days, the victory tactically and strategically would rest with the latter. = =p.93- As regards Suffren's purpose, there is nothing to indicate that he meant to make such an attack as Hughes describes.Having twelve ships to the English eleven,his intention seems to have been to pursue the usual English practice- form line parallel to the enemy, bear down together,and engage ship to ship.To this he added one simple combination;- the twelfth French ship, being unprovided with an opponent,was to engage the rear English ship on her lee side, placing her thus between two fires.In truth, a combination upon the van and center, such as Hughes describes, is tactically inferior to a like effort upon the center and rear of a column. This is true of steamers even, which, though less liable to loss of motive power,must still turn round to get from van to rear,losing many valuable seconds; but it is specially true of sailing vessels, and above all in the light, baffling airs which are apt to mark the change of monsoon at the season when this fight was fought. ...In dealing with such seamen as the Captains of Hughes's fleet, it would have been an error to assail the van insted of the rear.Only a dead calm could have kept the latter out of action. = Suffren's attack is thus described by Captain Chevalier. After mentioning Hughes's forming line on the ??starboard"?? tack he says: = "This maneuver was initiated by the French,and the two squadrons ran on parallel lines heading about westnorthwest; at eleven, - our line being well formed, Suffren made signal to keep away to westsouthwest,by a movement all together.Our ships did not keep their bearing upon the prescribed line, and the van, composed of the best sailers,came first within range of the enemy. At once, the leading ships of the English fleet opened fire upon the VENGEUR and ARTESIEN [French van]. These two ships, having luffed, [i.e.turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching him] to return the fire, were at once ordered to keep away again. Suffren, who wished for a decisive action, kept his course, receiving without reply the shots directed upon his ships by the enemy. When at pistol range of the SUPERB, he hauled to the wind, and the signal to open fire appeared at his mainmast head. -p. 94-.-p. 94-Admiral Hughes having only eleven ships, the BIZARRE, according to the dispositions taken by the Commander-in-Chief, was to attack on the quarter the rear ship of the English fleet and double on it to leeward. At the moment when the first cannon shots were heard, our worst sailers were not up with their stations. Breathing the letter and not the spirit of the Commodore's orders, the captains of these ships luffed at the same time as those which preceded them. Hence it resulted that the French line formed a curve whose extremities were represented in the van by the ARTESIAN and VENGEUR, and in the rear by the BIZARRE, AJAX, and SEVERE. In consequence, these ships were very far from those which corresponded to them in the enemy's line." = Mahan continues: "It is evident from all this ---that the French chief intended an attack elementary in conception and difficult of execution. To keep a fleet on line of bearing, sailing free, requires much drill, especially when the ships have different rates of speed, as had Suffren's. The extreme injury suffered by the SUPERB and MONMOUTH-- undeniably due to a concentration - cannot be attributed to Suffren's dispositions. --- The kernel of the action seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitious concentration of two French seventy-fours and one sixty-four and an English seventy-four and sixty-four. Assuming the ships to have been actually of the same force as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside only, one hundred and six guns against sixty-nine." --- = "The faculty of moving together with uniformity and precision is too necessary to the development of the full power of a body of ships to be lightly esteemed; it is essential to that concentration of effort at which Suffren rightly aimed, but which he was not always careful to secure by previous dispositions." = This battle and the one occurring on the same day between Rodney and De Grasse, point out the value of concentration of maximum effort against a portion of the enemy's force. Ruyter applied the same principle at the Texel, - Nelson, at sea, - and Napoleon, on shore, applied the same principle repeatedly. = p. 95 =Beatty suffered from it at Dogger Bank and attempted to use it at Jutland.As Baudry says: "Let us remember this much of both Trafalgar and the Nile - that - individually and collectively alike- the victors maneuvered against their opponents, to create a superiority of numbers in their own favor." = The result is seen in our instructions for battle today. Maximum effect over smallest practicable area at critical point is prescribed as the goal. Fire distribution of present day distinctly provides for concentration on an end of enemy line just as Suffren planned to use it against enemy rear. Standardization of units of the fleet is carefully made to prevent just the difficulty Suffren had in trying to approach at a uniform rate all along the line, and we have prescribed definite battle formations for closing [or, if desired, opening] the range together while holding a line of bearing of division guides. = It is doubtful if any single engagement under sail more clearly indicates the similarity of these principles as applied to sail then and to steam now. Particularly Mahan's comment on the effect of the French, accidentally or otherwise, concentrating a force of approximately one hundred nine guns against sixty-nine, and of the importance of the "faculty of moving together with uniformity and precision" and its necessity for "concentration of effort" is as applicable now as it was then. = Precision of movement in maneuver and concentration against a portion of enemy force [whether separated by distance, lack of wind, smoke screen, or otherwise] must always be of prime importance in battle. = A further consideration is that the insufficient indoctrination of his captains [whether by reason of their perversity or his failure to properly disseminate the doctrine] deprived Suffren of the decisive victory he sought. Here also it is as necessary now as then that all units be so throughly indoctrinated that coordination of effort is always sure. {END} [There are 95 pages, of which page 66 was not included in photocopy sent 1998 from Naval War College archive]. ===End TACTICS1924. 1925Australia NamesMelb. Eileen Ham R.N. B. Oddie G Nash O H Cuthbert W.H. Burnham G.S. Lloyd W. Roberts W.H. Dando N Menzies R. Bell D. Fitchett B Buckland L. Gleeson P. O'Malley Water Commissioner Nagambie; S. Hartigan 29 July St. Joseph Convent Jephcott, Guppy LAUNCESTON R. J. McIntyre J Cottier J Forrest, Billie, Mr. McCarthy Mrs. Cottrell Gorman E. Maxeme Andrewartha, BALLARAT : Mr. and Mrs. L.H. Vernon 1503 Hurt St. Echuca Mr. & Mrs. Stokes & Mary Stokes Mr. Simmie Shepperton: wild ride Shepperton to Maroopna Mr. Lincoln Maroopna - Boy Scouts, with medal Tatura: Mr. Hasty Bendigo: C.J. Glover. Geelong: Hollis, Newland, Curley drove us in his car. Cooperdown: Walls, snapshot of swan's nest New Zealand: Napier:Anderson, Betty Shillling Shie??. Captain Smith, Snow Clarke, Mrs. Hawke Captain Lochner [from Auckland] O. Morran L. Mellor, Sally Williams, mr. Kenneth Williams, R. P. Hakiwa E.C.S. McFarlane, A.H. Piper J.L. Whitlores, Wellington: Leslie Taverner, Mr. and Mrs. Lancelot Moore Captain J.B. Rainey General Manager Cunard Line, J Barton Rainey Miss M. Flux, Captain A. West Mr. Martin Leckie (Luckie) J.H. Fowler, Robert Arlow, D.E. Grachy, Mr. Kitching, M. Turrell, A. Sheldon, R.I. Jones Algiers: 52 Boulevard Thiers Mr. & Mrs. S.S. Powers, Compagnie Internationale des Machines Agricoles, T. Carlyon's St. Kilda after American Club Drive